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Articles
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Touchdown: The Regulatory Function of
Private International Law in an Era of
Globalization
ROBERT WAI*

Globalization is sometimes considered to have led to
the liftoff of international business transactionsfrom
national regulatory oversight.
This Article is
concerned with the connection between a liftoff of
transnationalbusiness processes and the laws related
to internationaleconomic transactions. In particular,
the Article examines the "governing" role that
national private laws play in transnational business
relations through an examination of the regulatory
function of private international law. The Article
describes how recent "internationalist" reforms in
*

Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Canada.

S.J.D. Harvard Law School, 2000; LL.B. University of British Columbia, 1992; M.Phil.
Oxford University, 1990; B.Com. McGill University, 1987. Parts of this Article were
presented at the International Conference of the Law and Society Association & the Research
Committee on Sociology of Law, Budapest, Hungary, July 4, 2001, and at the Workshop on
New Scholarship in International Public and Private Law, The Hague, July 22, 2000. My
thanks to Osgoode Hall Law School and York University for providing funding to attend
these conferences. The Article is based on chapters from an S.J.D. dissertation submitted to
Harvard Law School in May 2000 and submitted for the Addison Brown Prize in May 1998.
My thanks to Professors Bill Alford, Rob Howse, and Anne-Marie Slaughter for comments
on relevant chapters of the dissertation, to my colleagues Toni Williams, Lome Sossin, Craig
Scott, lain Ramsay, and Harry Arthurs for comments on drafts of the Article, and to Jackie
Tabar for research assistance. In addition, my thanks for the funding for graduate research
provided by a Fulbright Scholarship, a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of
Canada Doctoral Fellowship, a Law Foundation of British Columbia Graduate Fellowship,
and the Addison Brown Essay Prize in Private International Law at Harvard Law School.
Particular thanks to Professor David Kennedy for his supervision of my doctoral work and
for inspiring attempts at creative scholarly engagement with all aspects of international law.

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[40:209

private internationallaw contributeto a possible liftoff
and discusses representativepolicy justifications for
these reforms, such as the facilitation of international
commerce, the attainment of interstate cooperation,
and the promotion of cosmopolitanfairness to parties.
It then explores reasons why the traditionalregulatory
function of private international law has been
obscured in recent internationalist reform, in
particular by its ready, if misleading, identification
with parochialism. To address such concerns, the
Article describes a cosmopolitan account of the
regulatoryfunction of private internationallaw in the
contemporary era of globalization. It identifies the
nature of the regulatory challenges that face private
international law in the current internationalsystem
and makes proposalsfor the kinds of regulatory role
that private international law could play in the
constitution of a pluralisticsystem of governance that
might address some of the excesses of economic
globalization.
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 212
II.

THE AUTONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND THE
INTERNATIONALIST REFORM OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
L A W ......................................................................................

2 15
A. TransnationalLiftoff?-Puzzles ConcerningThe
IncreasingAutonomy of InternationalBusiness in
D ispute Resolution .........................................................
215
B. The ChangingRole of the State: The Internationalist
Reform of PrivateInternationalLaw ............................. 218
1. Internationalist Reform in Private International
Law ..........................................
2 19
2. Arbitration ................................................................
220
C. InternationalistVisions and the Policy Concerns of
the Legal Decision Maker .............................................. 222
D. The Policy DiscoursesofLiberalInternationalism....... 224
E. The Dangers ofInternationalistPolicy Formalism....... 229
III.

THE ELUSIVE REGULATORY FUNCTION OF PRIVATE

INTERNATIONAL LAW ........................................................... 232
A. The TransnationalRegulatory Function of Domestic
PrivateLaws ...................................................................
232

2002]

TRANSNATIONAL LIFTOFFAND JURIDICAL TOUCHDOWN

1. The Regulatory Function of Private Laws as the
Protection of Third Parties .......................................
2. The Regulatory Function of Private Law
"As Between the Parties" .........................
B. The Regulatory Function in TraditionalPrivate
InternationalLaw ...........................................................
1. The Influential Structures of Public Policy
Argumentation in Public International Law .............
2. The Regulatory Function in Traditional Private
International Law: Deference to the Municipal .......
C. Regulatory Considerationsand the Problem of
ParochialProgressivism................................................
1. Defending Regulatory Interests in Private
International Law: Anti-Comity, U.S. Style ............
2. The Dangers of Parochialism in Defending
Regulatory Concerns ................................................
IV.

211

233
237
239
240
241
244
245
247

ARTICULATING A COSMOPOLITAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE
REGULATORY FUNCTION OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION ..................................... 250

A. The Problems of TransnationalCooperation................. 250
1. Regulatory Gaps .......................................................
251
2. Regulatory Competition ........................................... 254
B. The Problem of "Liftoff' in TransnationalPrivate
Actor Values ...................................................................
258
C. Regulation andAdjudication through the Countervailing
Networks of TransnationalCivil Society ........................ 260
V.

VI.

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A VENUE FOR
TRANSNATIONAL REGULATORY CONCERNS ..........................

264
A. The Liftoff and Touchdown of TransnationalBusiness
Dispute-Resolutionand the DialecticalRelationshipof
State andNon-State Systems .......................................... 265
B. PrivateInternationalLaw and the Constitution of a
PluralistSystem of TransnationalRegulation ............... 268
1. Differentiating Among Components of the
Internationalist Reform Agenda ............................... 270
2. Constituting a Pluralist System of Regulatory
Governance ...............................................................
271
CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 273

COL UMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LA W

I.

[40:209

INTRODUCTION

This Article is concerned with the connection between
globalization processes and the laws related to international economic
transactions. In particular, the Article examines the "governing" role
that national private laws play in overseeing transnational business
conduct through the regulatory function of private international law.
The traditional legal understanding of the law of international
business transactions considers such transactions to be regulated by a
legal framework of a multiplicity of different, often overlapping, state
jurisdictions with which a transaction has contacts. 1 Under this
framework, a number of different legal regimes might have claims to
regulate such transactions, both as between the parties and as between
transacting parties and third parties. These legal regimes include both
public laws and regulation and applicable rules of private law, such as
tort and contract.
Under
contemporary
globalization,
this
traditional
understanding has been disturbed by the increasing ability of
transnational business actors to achieve a "liftoff' from the terrain of
national regulation. A number of writers have identified the ways in
which global economic and social processes have reconfigured
national legal practices. 2 At the procedural level, these writers focus
on the increase in dispute resolution by means of international
commercial arbitration rather than state-based litigation. At the
substantive level, these studies have emphasized the importance of the
growth of lex mercatoria, a delocalized private law based on the
customs of international trade, and other forms of non-traditional
rules in the regulation of transnational business conduct and disputeresolution.
This Article explores the issue of the transnational liftoff of
international business transactions from national regulatory oversight
through an examination of the regulatory function of private
international law 3 in this contemporary era of globalization. It is
1. See, e.g., DETLEv F. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS, iii-iv (2d ed.,
1998); Detlev F. Vagts, DisputeResolution Mechanisms in InternationalBusiness, 203 REC.
DES COURS 1 (1987) [hereinafter Vagts, DisputeResolution].
2. See, e.g., YVES DEZALAY

& BRYANT

GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL

COMMERCIAL ARBrRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
(1996) [hereinafter DEZALAY & GARTH]; SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY
IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (1996); GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE (Gunther Teubner ed.,
1997) [hereinafter GLOBAL LAW].
3. This Article uses "private international law" to refer to the subject also known as
the conflict of laws; see DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 33 (Lawrence
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important to connect doctrinal reform in private international law with
more general public policy debates and academic studies concerning
law in an era of globalization. 4 For those interested more generally in
globalization and governance, the reform of private international law
provides a concrete study of the role of private laws in the
constitution of transnational processes that include intersecting roles
for state and non-state actors in "governing" transnational conduct in
a global economy.
To that end, Part 1 of the Article describes the role that some
recent "intemationalist" reforms in private international law play in
the increased autonomy of transnational business and briefly
discusses some reasons for undertaking such reform. I argue that
these reforms are motivated by a liberal internationalist policy vision
of an international system that overstates some objectives (i.e.,
promoting international trade and interstate cooperation) and obscures
other worthwhile objectives (i.e., effective transnational regulation).
Part Ed describes the regulatory function of private
international law in relation to the regulatory function of underlying
national private laws. This Part then explores how the traditional
regulatory function of private international law has been obscured in
recent reform, in particular by its ready, if misleading, identification
with parochialism. In traditional private international law, the
regulatory interest was effectively addressed through deference to
local laws and institutions. In recent internationalist reform, in
contrast, the policy objective of effective regulation has been
obscured and demoted in comparison with supposedly
uncontroversial international objectives such as facilitating the
international economy and promoting cooperative interstate relations.
Collins ed., 12th ed. 1993) [hereinafter DIcEY & MORRIs]. Although the term "conflict of
laws" is more often used in common law jurisdictions, I use the term "private international
law" because this Article primarily addresses questions of jurisdiction, choice of law, and
recognition and enforcement of judgments related to transactions that cross national
boundaries. In addition, the Article addresses policy concerns and policy arguments about
the international system rather than federal systems.
4. For reasons articulated in Part III, the politics of private international law have been
obscured. The politics of public international law, in contrast, are all too evident both to
supporters and critics. With respect to private international law, critical work has been
limited. Effective critical analysis has been done in the domestic context of U.S. conflict of
laws by Joseph Singer. Joseph W. Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. REv. 1 (1989)
[hereinafter Singer, Real Conflicts]; Joseph W. Singer, A PragmaticGuide to Conflicts, 70

B.U. L. REV. 731 (1990). Joel Paul has also done foundational work on the politics of private
international law. Joel Paul, The Isolation of Private InternationalLaw, 7 WIS. INT'L L.J.
149 (1988) [hereinafter Paul, Isolation]; Joel Paul, Comity in InternationalLaw, 32 HARv.
INT'L L.J. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Paul, Comity]. In Part III, I disagree with Paul's work on
specific issues, but his enterprise and method for analysis of private international law have
clearly influenced this Article very much.
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In this charged policy setting, it is difficult to make an argument for
the regulatory function of private international law without seeming
to fall into parochialism.
5
Part IV, therefore, attempts to elaborate a cosmopolitan
account of the regulatory function of private international law in the
contemporary era of globalization. This Part will explain how
problems of transnational regulatory coordination create regulatory
gaps and regulatory competition for the international system. It will
then elaborate on further regulatory challenges that may arise when
transnational business networks become autonomous and closed norm
systems and will explore the idea that countervailing networks of
regulatory oversight, such as transnational human rights networks,
will develop.
Finally, in Part V, I will argue that national private laws, and
therefore private international law, can contribute to an effective
system of transnational governance. This Part will suggest that
private international law can contribute to the constitution of a
pluralistic system of governance of economic globalization. National
private laws, as coordinated by private international law, may not be
the best tools for regulating transnational business conduct, but they
can retain relevance in regulation as part of the mechanism used by
various state and non-state actors in a pluralistic system of regulation.
The concerns of this Article are clearly related to issues
concerning globalization that dominate policy-making today.
Political issues such as the relation of economic globalization to nontrade objectives, the status of sovereignty, the decline in state
effectiveness, the spread of ideologies of neo-liberalism, and the
problems of less-developed societies are clearly reflected in private
international law. In some sense they dwarf the subject of this
Article. However, a careful consideration of the role of private
international law in transnational business autonomy responds to the
need for a more refined sense of how the terrain of economic
globalization is constituted.
In addition, and perhaps more
importantly, the policy debate around private international law
5. I use parochialism and cosmopolitanism in the sense described in Part II:
cosmopolitanism as a normative standpoint that includes the interests and values of
individuals and societies outside of a defined state's boundaries; parochialism as the
restriction of concern in normative judgments to the interests and values of the individuals
and society in a single state jurisdiction. At various points in Part II, I also refer to
"cosmopolitan fairness" or "cosmopolitan non-discrimination" as a description of the
narrower liberal policy goal of treating foreign and domestic individuals alike. A
cosmopolitan standpoint could go well beyond such conceptions of fairness towards a
broader conception of cosmopolitan justice and order. This is the subject and objective of
Parts III, IV, and V.
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reforms related to transnational business autonomy offers a strong
example of how the policy discourse about internationalism and
globalization can obscure worthwhile political objectives, such as
effective regulation, that could and should be part of law's function in
a global society.
II.

THE AUTONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL BusINEsS AND THE
INTERNATIONALIST REFORM OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

For international business networks to free themselves from
the regulation of domestic private law, doctrinal reforms have been
required in a number of subjects of private international law.
Especially in the past two decades, treaties, legislation, and court
decisions have instituted reforms in private international law that have
facilitated the increased autonomy of transnational business disputeresolution. A focus on these reforms highlights the process of the
constitution of a global legal regime and some of its unanticipated or
overlooked consequences, including consequences for regulatory
objectives.
A.

TransnationalLiftoff?-Puzzles Concerning The Increasing
Autonomy of InternationalBusiness in Dispute Resolution

As in other areas, systems of non-state rules have pre-existed
and co-existed with state laws in the area of business relations.
Historians of merchant law and commercial law have shown how the
state law system was a late .arrival with respect to the "governing
rules" of business relations. 6 Legal pluralist approaches to modem
business relations emphasize how even with the rise of state courts
and state law, many kinds of business relations remain governed by
non-legal rules such as trade custom or usage, 7 and by non-legal
enforcement mechanisms such as retention of security, reputational

6. See, e.g., LEON
COMMERCIAL LAW (1983);

E. TRAKMAN,
H.W. ARTHURS,

THE LAW MERCHANT: THE EVOLUTION OF
'WiTmOuT THE LAW': ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE

AND LEGAL PLURALISM INNINETEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 50-88 (1985); Harold J. Berman,
The Law of International Commercial Transactions (Lex Mercatoria), 2 EMORY J. INT'L
Disp. REs. 235 (1988).
7. See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963).
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damage, and vertical integration. 8 In addition, state law has often
incorporated the rules and customs found in trade custom and
practice. 9 Nonetheless, state law certainly plays a role in modem
business relations, and the development of an applicable system of
reliable third-party enforcement by private law is considered by many
to be necessary to expand 0the scale and scope of transactions in a
complex modem economy.'
The standard view that state law is relevant to modem
business transactions is reflected in the way in which the law of
international business transactions is understood as involving the laws
of a number of different state jurisdictions. 1" The state laws include
both public laws, such as labor law and tax laws, and private laws,
including tort-delict, property, and contract.
More recently, the importance of state law in governing
business relations is thought to be receding, as transnational business
networks lift off from the terrain of state systems, governed by a mix
of alternative forms of norms and processes.' 2 Recent studies by
Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth and by Gunther Teubner offer
innovative analyses of the return to prominence of trade custom and
non-state based dispute resolution specifically in the context of
transnational business networks.
In their study of international commercial arbitration, Dezalay
and Garth conduct extensive participant interviews that document the
8. See generally, DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CAPITALISM (1985).
9. In England, for example, largely through the work of Lord Mansfield, the common
law claimed some priority over the law merchant, but "it is a triumph of a peculiar sort: the
victorious system in effect adopted as its own the form and substance of the vanquished.".
ARTHURS, note 6, at 55. See also TRAKMAN, supra note 6, at 27-29.
10. NORTH, supra note 8, at 54-60.
11. VAGTS, supra note 1. This can become quite intricate and complex. For example,
under the idea of dipegage, there is the potential for variation in governing laws across a
"single" business relationship. For example, different laws may be applicable to each of the
sales, carriage, and credit aspects of an international sales relationship. On dipegage, see,
e.g., Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, June 19, 1980
[hereinafter Rome Convention], 1605 U.N.T.S. 59, arts. 3(1) and 4(1); DICEY & MORRIS,
supra note 3, at 1205-08; THE CANADIAN LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE,
wITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON EXPORT AND IMPORT OF GOODS AND SERVICES 171 (J.G.
Castel et al., eds., 2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter CANADIAN LAW AND PRACTICE].
12.

A popular version of this idea, not explored here, is the growth of transnational

ethnic networks, such as the Overseas Chinese, who rely primarily on non-state tools for
governing business relations. See, e.g., JANET T. LANDA, TRUST, ETHNICITY AND IDENITrY:
BEYOND THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF ETHNIC TRADING NETWORKS, CONTRACT
LAW, AND GIFT-EXCHANGE (1994); JOEL KOTKIN, TRIBES: How RACE, RELIGION AND
IDENTITY DETERMINE SUCCESS IN THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY (1992).
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rapid rise of arbitration in international business relations and
demonstrate how the construction of this new order is linked to the
political, legal, and moral entrepreneurship of various participants in
the arbitration community-including academics, lawyers, arbitrators,
and business actors. 13 Dezalay and Garth argue that the legal field of
international commercial arbitration was produced from a complex
mix of competition and cooperation among a variety of interests. For
example, Dezalay and Garth identify a tension between two principal
groups of supporters of arbitration. The "grand old men" typically are
an older generation that includes more Europeans, academics,
generalists, and supporters of a more informal, diplomatic vision of
arbitration as part of a larger international order. In contrast, the "new
technocrats" are a younger generation that includes more Americans,
specialists, practitioner-litigators, and supporters of arbitration as a
commercially efficacious and economically valuable service for
clients. 14 Although these and other groups compete with each other
for arbitration business, they also have acted cooperatively to promote
the increased use of arbitration by business actors and to persuade
state actors to accept the use of arbitration instead of courts for
international dispute-resolution among business actors.
In Teubner's striking studies of transnational legal pluralism,
transnational business relations in which disputes are resolved by
international commercial arbitration and lex mercatoriaare a primary
15
example of systems which "break the frame" of national laws.
Teubner argues that contemporary global society must be viewed as
comprised of multiple norm systems, each of which has its own
participants and norms. 16 The result is "global law without a state,"
in which systems of transnational commerce and multinational
corporations, as well as transnational systems of human rights and
labor actors, challenge the supremacy of state-based legal systems for
pre-eminence in the production of social norms.17

13. DEzALAY & GARTH, supra note 2, at 34.
14. Id.at34-41.
15. Gunther Teubner, Breaking Frames: The Global Interplay of Legal and Social
Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 149 (1997) (reviewing MICHEL VAN DE KERCHOVE & FRANCOIS
OST, LE DRorr OU LES PARADOXES DU JEU (1992)), [hereinafter Teubner, Breaking Frames].
See generally GLOBAL LAW, supra note 2.
16. See Gunther Teubner, 'Global Bukowina': Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in
GLOBAL LAW WrrHouT A STATE 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997). Teubner relies on the work
on law in plural social systems developed by theorists such as Niklas Luhmann. See, e.g.,
NIKLAS LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGIcAL THEORY OF LAW (1985).

17. See generallythe studies in GLOBAL LAW, supranote 2.
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While filled with insights, both of these works also leave
significant questions unanswered. At the descriptive level, the puzzle
that interests me is the role of state governments and state legal
systems in the development of global law. The studies show how a
host of interest groups-including business actors and various
service-providers in the arbitration sector-were in favor of, and
acted to promote, the expansion of the arbitration regime in
international transactions. But why is it that different states around
the world permitted and indeed, to some extent, promoted the "liftoff'
of this realm of commercial arbitration from the applicability of
national laws and the oversight of national courts? What motivates
legislators and judges in state legal systems to accept arbitration,
given that arbitration does not offer these actors any obvious
pecuniary or status gains? To better understand this puzzle, it is
useful to examine related developments in private international law as
a key factor in the connection between state laws, policies, and actors,
on the one hand, and the "liftoff' of transnational business actors, on
the other.
At the prescriptive level, I am interested in the consequences
for regulatory concerns of an increase in the relative autonomy of
international commercial dispute resolution from traditional state
legal systems. To accept completely the "reality" that effective power
has shifted to non-state actors is to accept too readily the effective
"privatization" of private law. Private law and private international
law can potentially serve public purposes, even if they are too often
not deployed in that way. A careful consideration of private
international law may produce a better sense of the role that stategenerated national private laws and private international law could
play in the regulation of the transnational conduct of private actors,
either through direct regulation or through coordination with other
regulatory mechanisms, including public laws and non-state actors.
B.

The ChangingRole of the State: The InternationalistReform
of PrivateInternationalLaw

Private international law is an excellent location from which
to view the connection between state systems and non-state business
actors. In turn, recent reforms in private international law offer the
chance to view some of the changes that are occurring in the relations
of state systems and non-state actors, and to consider how that change
has occurred. This Part will briefly survey a set of reforms to the
rules of private international law that have been geared towards
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augmenting the autonomy of private actors and increasing the
efficiency of transnational dispute resolution.
1.

Internationalist Reform in Private International Law

Significant doctrinal reforms in private international law have
promoted the autonomy of transnational dispute-resolution among
private actors with respect to the key subjects of private international
With respect to jurisdiction, many reforms have been
law.
implemented to rationalize and limit assumption of jurisdiction by
state courts. 18 Reforms in this vein have included the enforcement of
forum selection clauses19and the use of forum non conveniens in
common law jurisdictions, 20 and the allocation of jurisdiction of
courts under treaties such as the Brussels and Lugano Conventions in
Europe. 21 With respect to choice of law rules, efforts have been made
to enforce contractual choice of law clauses 22 and to increase the
predictability and objectivity of choice of law in tort.23 With respect

18. For a comprehensive survey, see DECLINING JURISDICTION IN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW (J.J. Fawcett ed., 1995) [hereinafter DECLINING JURISDICTION].
19. E.g., The M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); Carnival Cruise
Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991); Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board the Elefiheria
v. Owners of the Eleftheria, (1969) 2 All E.R. 641 (Eng.); DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 3, at
419-24, Rule 32.
20. E.g., Amchem Products Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Board),
[1993] 1 S.C.R. 897 (Can.); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); Piper Aircraft v.
Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 247 (1981); Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd., [1987] A.C. 460
(Eng.). See generally, DECLINING JURISDICTION, supra note 18; Ellen L. Hayes, Forum Non
Conveniens in England,Australia andJapan: The Allocation ofJurisdictionin Transnational
Litigation,26 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 41 (1992).
21. The Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1262 U.N.T.S. 1653 [hereinafter Brussels
Convention] and the Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, 1659 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter Lugano
Convention] employ an "international" method of rationalizing the assumption ofjurisdiction
among national courts in Europe. The conventions strictly allocate jurisdiction among the
courts of the contracting states based on mandatory criteria agreed to by international
negotiation. Overlapping actions are avoided by requiring a stay of actions commenced in a
second jurisdiction if jurisdiction has been assumed by the courts of another member state.
Furthermore, the conventions provide an integrated system of mandatory recognition and
enforcement of judgments from courts which have assumed jurisdiction in accordance with
the conventions (art. 21).
22. E.g., Rome Convention, supranote 11, art. 3. For the laws of the United Kingdom,
see DICEY & MORRIS, supranote 3, at 1211, Rule 175. For the laws of the United States, see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
23. E.g., Jensen v. Tolofsor [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022; [1995] 1 W.W.R. 609 (Can.)
(reinstating the rule for choice of law in tort to a form of the lex loci delicti, the law of the
place of the tort). For commentary, see Peter Kincaid, Jensen v. Tolofson and the Revolution
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to the recognition and enforcement of judgments, common law courts
and the Brussels and Lugano Conventions have restricted the grounds
for review or refusal of recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments. 24 More recently, the Hague Conference on Private
International Law has been the venue for discussions
for an
25
international treaty with respect to foreign judgments.
2.

Arbitration

The internationalist reform of private international law is most
apparent in the greater willingness of state courts to both compel
parties to arbitration when there is an arbitration clause and enforce
the arbitral awards that result. The willingness to support arbitration
is common to many different kinds of legal jurisdictions.26 Treaties
and legislative enactments have been important in this respect, in
particular the New York Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958.27 Among other
provisions, the Convention requires a state court to decline
jurisdiction when faced with a valid arbitration agreement and to
in Tort Choice ofLaw, 74 CAN. B. REV. 537 (1995). For the laws of the U.K., see Part III of
the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, c.42.
24. E.g., Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 (Can.). Under
article 26 of the Brussels Convention, supra note 21, foreign judgments shall be recognized
without special proceedings. Only limited exceptions are provided (arts. 27 and 28).
25. The Hague Conference on private international law is an interesting example of a
complex transnational venue for legal reform. The Hague Conference is a mixed
governmental and non-governmental, transnational body, including many leading academics,
which has provided many reform proposals in private international law. See, e.g., T.M.C.
ASSER INSTITUTE, THE INFLUENCE OF THE HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS TO CELEBRATE THE 100TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE HAGUE CONFERENCE
ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1993); Hague Conference on Private International Law,

Proceedings of the Seventeenth Session, Tome 1-Second Part, "Centenary" (1995). Most
recently, the Hague Conference has been the venue for stalled discussions on an international
convention on recognition and enforcement of judgments. See Arthur von Mehren,
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A New Approach For the Hague
Conference? 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 271 (1994); Symposium, Enforcing Judgments
Abroad: The Global Challenge, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1 (1998); Vaughan Black,
Commodifying Justicefor Global Free Trade: The ProposedHague Judgments Convention,
38 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 267 (2000). The Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters was adopted by the Special Commission
of the Hague Conference on October 30, 1999. See Preliminary Draft Convention on
Jurisdiction
and
Foreign Judgments
in Civil
and
Commercial Matters,
http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.html (last visited July 8, 2001) [hereinafter
Preliminary Draft Convention].
26. See generally DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 2.
27. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (1959) [hereinafter New York Convention].
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recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards. 28 The Convention has
been signed by major commercial nations ranging from the United
States to China, and has been implemented in various pieces of state
legislation. 29
In addition, the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration, a model law that provides more
details on arbitration procedures and that elaborates on provisions of
the New York Convention, has
influenced legislation or been adopted
30
ofjurisdictions.
number
in a
Common law courts have supported the turn to arbitration by
limiting the ability of parties to resist enforcement of arbitration
clauses or arbitral awards. 3 1 Courts, for example, have shown greater
willingness to enforce arbitration clauses even where the claim was
that the contract was void for reasons such as duress or illegality, if
the claim of invalidity of the contract did not apply specifically to the
arbitration clause as well. 32 Courts increasingly permit arbitration
28. Id. art. 11(3).
The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect
of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article,
shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it
finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed.
Article III provides that each Contracting State "shall recognize arbitral awards
as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedures of the
territory where the award is relied upon" under the conditions set out in the
other articles of the Convention.
29. Indeed, it has been argued that states have gone beyond even what is required by the
terms of the Convention in restricting review by their national courts of foreign arbitral
awards. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION
AND ARBITRATION 109-15 (1992). For current information on parties to the Convention, see
http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty. See also Treaties Chart, in INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION: A
GUIDE TO JURISDICTION, PRACTICE, AND STRATEGY, ch. 1 (David Epstein, Jeffrey L. Snyder &
Charles S. Baldwin eds., 3d ed. 1998).
30. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 21 June 1985, 24
I.L.M. 1302 (1985) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law]. For commentary, see RUSSELL J.
WEINTRAUB, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION: PRACTICE AND PLANNING 48081 (1994). The UNCITRAL Model Law has been adopted in Canada at the federal level and
in most provinces. See CANADIAN LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, ch. 21.
31. See, e.g., Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp., [1991] 1 W.W.R. 219 (B. C.
C.A. 1991) (Can.)[leave to appeal to Supreme Court of Canada dismissed, Dec. 13, 1990].
32. See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 30, art. 16(1). For cases in the United
States, see Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); Apollo
Computer, Inc. v. Berg, 886 F.2d 469 (1st Cir. 1989); INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION: CASES, MATERIALS AND NOTES ON THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL

BUSINESS DISPUTES 508-24 (W. Michael Reisman, W. Lawrence Craig, William W. Park &

Jan Paulsson eds., 1997) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION]. In the
United Kingdom, there is less support for a separability doctrine; Ashville Invs. Ltd. v. Elmer
Contractors Ltd., 2 Lloyd's Rep. 73 (1988); cf OKEZIE CHUKWUMERIJE, CHOICE OF LAW IN
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 31-32 (1994).
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tribunals to consider almost all types of contractual disputes between
the parties, including disputes about the validity, effect, and
interpretation of arbitration agreements, to be decided according to
the applicable law.33 In many jurisdictions, legislation and courts
have expanded the power of arbitration panels to rule on issues of
their own jurisdiction. 34 Another key internationalist reform has been
the willingness of national courts to expand arbitrability of disputes so
as to permit arbitration panels to pronounce on almost every kind of
private law dispute, even in areas which may involve substantial
35
public policy interests.
C.

Internationalist36
Visions and the Policy Concerns of the Legal
Decision Maker

Understanding why the rules of private international law have
changed requires a consideration of the role of state actors-in
particular legislators and courts-in promoting or acquiescing in the
"transnational liftoff' of arbitration and the use of non-state norms for
resolving transnational civil and commercial disputes. Interests
narrowly defined-as in the pecuniary interests or social capital of
arbitrators or business lawyers-cannot readily and completely
explain the behavior of judges and legislators. Nor can simple
economic and political power, from which the judges and legislators
33. DICEY & MORRIs, supra note 3, at 576-79, Rule 57(1); UNCITRAL Model Law,
supra note 30, arts. 16 and 28.
34. E.g., UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 30, art. 16 (competence of arbitral
tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction, with possibility for request for decision by a state
court on any preliminary decisions of a tribunal); INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION, supra note 32, at 524-526, 645-56; Thomas Carbonneau, Mitsubishi: The
Folly of Quixotic Internationalism, 2 ARB. INT'L 116, 135 (1986) [hereinafter Carbonneau,
Mitsubishi]; Thomas Carbonneau, The Exuberant Pathway to Quixotic Internationalism:
Assessing the Folly ofMitsubishi, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 265 (1986).
35. The sharpest debate has occurred in the United States, as in the debate surrounding
the controversial decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. SolerChrysler Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985), which will be discussed below. A key earlier
case was Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974). In First Options of Chicago v.
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995), the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that arbitrability may
depend on what the specific intention of the parties was with respect to whether an issue was
arbitrable.
36. The argument in the remaining sections of Part II rely on Robert Wai, Commerce,
Cooperation, Cosmopolitanism: Structures of Internationalist Policy Argumentation in
Private International Law (2000) (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Harvard Law School) (on
file with Harvard University Library) [hereinafter Wai, Commerce, Cooperation,
Cosmopolitanism]. See also Robert Wai, In the Name of the International: The Supreme
Court of Canada and the InternationalistTransformationof Private InternationalLaw, 39
Can. Y.B. Int'l L. (forthcoming 2002) [hereinafter Wai, In the Name of the International].
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are relatively insulated. Instead, one must further investigate the
kinds of values and beliefs that key legal decision-makers have about
the international system as it is and as it should be.
The values and beliefs of common law judges are important in
part because effective implementation of treaty obligations relies on
state legislators and judges accepting and promoting the working of
the arbitration process. In addition, international conventions cover
only a limited number of internationalist reforms and are not binding
on many jurisdictions. 37 As a result, reform in private international
law in common law jurisdictions has been effected through domestic
legislation 38 and, above all, through court decisions 39 concerning
jurisdiction, choice of law, recognition, and enforcement.
In addition, common law judges are expected to provide a set
of public justifications for their decisions. The policy reasons
provided by common law judges provide an unusually good insight
into the policy ideals and visions of the international system that have
been present in the minds of key legal decision-makers who have
facilitated the increased use and autonomy of private disputeresolution among transnational business actors. More generally, the
reasoning in private international law provides evidence of the beliefs
about the international system that are held by actors with influence
on lawmaking.
The policy arguments deployed by judges in
internationalist reform may also be representative of the thinking of
such other actors as legislators, litigants, and the general populace.

37. The New York Convention, supra note 27, is by far the most significant
development in international law in the area related to international litigation for areas
outside Europe. The two Hague Conventions on judicial assistance are widely in effect, but
concern minor reforms in the relatively insignificant subjects of the taking of evidence
abroad and service abroad. Hague Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and
Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 658 U.N.T.S. 163;
Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters, Mar.
18, 1970, 847 U.N.T.S. 241. Other than these conventions, the only relevant international
conventions were the private international law provisions of specialized conventions such as
the Warsaw Convention on Air Carriage. Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 137 L.N.T.S. 11; as amended
by the Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Carriage by Air, Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 (the "Hague Protocol").
38. For example, the legislative revision of English choice of law rules for tort
contained in Part III of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995,
supra note 23.
39. Supra, Part II.B.1. In Wai, In the Name of the International,supra note 36, I argue

that internationalist reform by common law judges in private international law is an example
ofjudicial activism in the name of the international.
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The Policy Discoursesof LiberalInternationalism

The policy thinking evidenced in the reform of private
international law with respect to dispute resolution in transnational
business partakes of the broader contemporary policy discourses of
liberal internationalism. 40 In particular, internationalist reform in law
is supported by three distinct sets of policy objectives for the
international system: (1) an economic objective of facilitating
international commerce, (2) a political objective of increasing
interstate cooperation and order, and (3) a moral objective of avoiding
parochialism and promoting non-discrimination. In internationalist
reform, these three distinct policy objectives are argued to reinforce
41
each other in support of a common set of programmatic reforms.
These economic, political, and moral policy discourses have
their origins in the traditions of international liberalism in which the
interests of autonomous sovereignties are reconciled with each other
through belief in the non-controversial benefits to each sovereign
entity of international trade, international cooperation, and
cosmopolitan non-discrimination.42 This powerful vision of the
international order argues for the development of laws, institutions,
and norms that would convince individual states to avoid policies
which are geared to short-term self-interest in order to achieve
potential long-run cooperative benefits. These policy discourses are
particularly influential in international trade law and public
international law, but they also have had much recent influence in the
field of private international law.
40. See Wai, Commerce, Cooperation,Cosmopolitanism,supra note 36.
41. These kinds of policy arguments align loosely with what Teubner refers to as the
"colliding rationalities" of international economy, international relations, and international
justice. Gunther Teubner, Altera ParsAudiatur: Law in the Collision of Discourses,in LAw,
SOCIETY AND ECONOMY: CENTENARY ESSAYS FOR THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND
POLITICAL SCIENCE 1895-1995 149 (Richard Rawlings ed., 1997). See also Gunther Teubner,
After Privatisation?-TheMany Autonomies of PrivateLaw, in FROM DISSONANCE TO SENSE:
WELFARE STATE EXPECTATIONS, PRIVATISATION AND PRIVATE LAW 51 (Thomas Wilhelmsson

& Samuli Hurri eds., 1999). I argue, however, that in liberal internationalist reform, these
policy discourses are argued to reinforce, rather than to collide with, each other in support of
a set of reforms.
42. I trace this to the work of liberal thinkers on international affairs, in particular John
Stuart Mill. See Robert Wai, John Stuart Mill and International Relations (1990)
(unpublished M. Phil. dissertation, Oxford University) (on file with author and the Oxford
University Library). More generally on liberal traditions of international relations and law,
see Anne-Marie Slaughter, InternationalLaw in a World ofLiberalStates, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L.
503 (1995); Anne-Marie Slaughter, InternationalLaw and InternationalRelations: A Dual
Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 204 (1993); TERRY NARDIN & DAVID R. MAPEL, TRADITIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL ETHICS, chs. 7, 8, 10, 12 (1992); CHARLES BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1979).
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These liberal internationalist policy objectives have a complex
but structured role in the legal and policy argumentation surrounding
legal reform in private international law, including with respect to
arbitration. Sometimes the objectives of facilitating international
commerce, promoting international cooperation, or ensuring
cosmopolitan fairness are invoked directly by judges, legislators, or
other policy makers. A striking example of this style of policy
reasoning is found in the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye,43 which liberalized
common law rules concerning recognition and enforcement of
judgments. This judgment initiated a dramatic series of judgments of
the Supreme Court of Canada that led to the internationalization and
constitutionalization of private international law in Canada. 44 In an
influential passage from that judgment, Justice La Forest writes that:
The common law regarding the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments is firmly anchored
in the principle of territoriality as interpreted and
applied by the English courts in the 19th Century....
This principle reflects the fact, one of the basic tenets
of international law, that sovereign states have
exclusive jurisdiction in their own territory. As a
concomitant to this, states are hesitant to exercise
jurisdiction over matters that may take place in the
territory of other states....
The world has changed since the above rules were
developed in 19th Century England. Modem means of
travel and communications have made many of these
19th Century concerns appear parochial. The business
community operates in a world economy and we
correctly speak of a world community even in the face
of decentralized political and legal power.
Accommodating the flow of wealth, skills and peoples
across state lines has now become imperative. Under
these circumstances, our approach to the recognition

43. Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 (Can.).
44. I have written more generally of the internationalist vision of the Supreme Court of
Canada and of Justice La Forest, the leading Canadian judge of international law of this
generation, in Robert Wai, Justice Girard La Forest and the Internationalist Turn in
Canadian Jurisprudence,in GtRARD V. LA FOREST AT THE SUPREME CouRT OF CANADA

1985-97, 421 (Rebecca Johnson & John McEvoy eds., 2000).
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and enforcement of45 foreign judgments would appear
ripe for reappraisal.
In addition to judges, many academic articles and treatises in private
international law invoke the need for reform for the purposes of
commerce, inter-state cooperation, and cosmopolitan fairness. In
particular, these liberal policy frames seem important to private
international law scholars who have turned to interdisciplinary
approaches such as economic theory,46 international relations
theory, 47 and moral and political theory.4
Internationalist policy objectives also operate indirectly. First,
these objectives can influence the application of doctrine in particular
cases. The values can form a vague but powerful background for the
interpretation of the facts of a case and the interpretation and
application of a rule to the facts. Second, doctrinal reforms are
commonly justified in terms of intermediate policy values such as
certainty, uniformity, harmonization, comit49 for foreign law and
institutions, and party autonomy and choice.

45. Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 (Can.), at 1095-96.
46. E.g., Ronald A. Brand, Recognition of Foreign Judgments as a Trade Law Issue:
The Economics of Private InternationalLaw, in ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: COMPARATIVE AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 592 (Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Alan 0.
Sykes eds., 1997); Michael Whincop, Conflicts in the Cathedral: Towards a Theory of
Property Rights in Private International Law, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 41 (2000); Michael
Whincop & Mary Keyes, The Market Tort in PrivateInternationalLaw, 19 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 215 (1999); MICHAEL WHINCOP & MARY KEYES, POLICY AND PRAGMATISM IN THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS (2001).

47. E.g., LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS, ch. 4 (2d ed. 1995) (game theory
approaches); Larry D. Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1990);
Slaughter, supra note 42 ("positive" liberal theories of international relations); Anne-Marie
Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalismand the Act of State Doctrine,
92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907 (1992).
48. E.g., BRILMAYER, supra note 47, ch. 5 ("Rights, Fairness and Choice of Law").
49. Although I focus on the example of Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler
Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, in the U.S. context, examples also exist in other jurisdictions.
For example, the need for uniformity and certainty in economic transactions to facilitate the
workings of the common market were significant objectives identified by the Commission in
the policy background to the Rome Convention, supra note 11. See Report on the
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 1979 O.J. (C59) 1, 4-5 (the
Giuliano-Lagarde Report), reprinted in RICHARD PLENDER, THE EUROPEAN CONTRACTS
CONVENTION: THE ROME CONVENTION ON THE CHOICE OF LAW FOR CONTRACTS, Annex V
(1991); DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 3, at 1195. For a sophisticated account of the tension
between different policy objectives and legal disciplines in the "Europeanisation" of private
law, see Christian Joerges, The EuropeanisationofPrivateLaw as a RationalisationProcess
and as a Contest ofDisciplines-anAnalysis of the Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts,3 EUROPEAN REVIEW OF PRIVATE LAW 175 (1995).
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One such example is the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court
in Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler.5"
In Mitsubishi, the U.S. Supreme
Court enforced an arbitration clause even in the presence of antitrust
claims based on U.S. laws. In the course of his majority decision,
Justice Blackmun cites the earlier Supreme Court decision in The
Bremen, which identified the policy reasons for enforcement of a
choice-of-forum clause:
The expansion of American business and industry will
hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn
contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all
disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our
courts.... We cannot have trade and commerce in
world markets and international waters exclusively on
our terms,
governed by our laws, and resolved in our
51
courts.

Justice Blackmun then discusses the policy reasons identified
by the Court in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. in support of enforcing
an arbitration agreement that included disputes related to U.S.
securities regulation:
A contractual provision specifying in advance the
forum in which disputes shall be litigated and the law
to be applied is . . . an almost indispensable
precondition to achievement of the orderliness and
predictability essential to any international business
transaction....
A parochial refusal by the courts of one country to
enforce an international arbitration agreement would
not only frustrate these purposes, but would invite
unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the
parties to secure tactical litigation advantages.... [It
would] damage the fabric of international commerce
and trade, and imperil the willingness and ability of

50. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614. The
decision in Mitsubishi can also be understood in the context of parallel support for arbitration
in domestic U.S. dispute resolution, with a parallel set of domestic values such as
"voluntarism, delegation, and self-regulation.". See Katherine Stone, Rustic Justice:
Community and Coercion Under the FederalArbitrationAct, 77 N. C. L. Rnv. 931 (1999);
DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 2, 151-81.
51. The M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co, 407 U.S. at 9, cited by Blackmun, J., in

Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. at 629.
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businessmen52 to enter into international commercial
agreements.
Justice Blackmun concludes that the enforcement of the
arbitration clause in the case before the Court should proceed. He
observes that:
As international trade has expanded in recent decades,
so too has the use of international arbitration to resolve
disputes arising in the course of that trade. The
controversies that international arbitral institutions are
called upon to resolve have increased in diversity as
well as in complexity. Yet the potential of these
tribunals
for efficient
disposition of legal
disagreements arising from commercial relations has
not yet been tested. If they are to take a central place
in the international legal order, national courts will
need to "shake off the old judicial hostility to
arbitration," Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg
Trading Corp., 126 F. 2d 978, 985 (CA2 1942), and
also their customary and understandable unwillingness
to cede jurisdiction of a claim arising under domestic
law to a foreign or transnational tribunal. To this
extent, at least, it will be necessary for national courts
to subordinate domestic notions of arbitrability to the
53
international policy favoring commercial arbitration.
Justice Blackmun summarizes the policy reasons for the
majority of the court by noting that:
[C]oncerns of international comity, respect for the
capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and
sensitivity to the need of the international commercial
system for predictability in the resolution of disputes
require that we enforce the parties' agreements, even
assuming that a contrary
result would be forthcoming
54
in a domestic context.
It is debatable whether policy objectives such as comity and
predictability can be defended as desirable ends in themselves, or
whether they instead rely for their justification on an informing vision
52. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. at 516-17 (cited by Blackmun, J. in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. at 631).
53. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. at 638-39.
54. Id. at 629.
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of an international system that would maximize global economic
benefits, promote international political cooperation and peace, and
limit parochial discrimination. 5
Regardless, the reasoning in
Mitsubishi is exemplary in showing how, whether through the direct
or indirect promotion of liberal internationalist policy values,
significant internationalist reform in private international law is
justified and achieved. The common incidence of internationalist
policy justification in cases such as Mitsubishi and Morguard also
demonstrates how a decentralized process of reform can lead to
similar results because of the prevalence of certain types of policy
arguments in the mindsets of key decision-makers.
E.

The Dangers of InternationalistPolicy Formalism

Liberal internationalist policy argumentation in private
international law can serve valuable ends. The ability to reconcile
conflict among the contrasting interests and ideas of international
order through liberal internationalist visions of international
cooperative benefit may partly explain how tensions were bridged
between the visions of "grand old men" and the "new technocrats" in
Dezalay and Garth's account of international arbitration. Liberal
internationalist policy visions may also bridge tensions between state
actors, such as national judges, and private actors, such as arbitrators
or international businesses, as well as between the differing
conceptions of the international system of metropolitan public
international lawyers and cosmopolitan international economic
lawyers. 56 Most significantly, liberal internationalist arguments have
helped to convince policy-makers grounded in particular state systems
to promote reforms that potentially promote the better protection of
international interests.
Predictably, however, liberal internationalist policy visions of
private international law have a number of limitations. Policy debate
about internationalist legal reform in private international law
frequently adopts a technical and necessitarian approach,57 which
fails to recognize that societies have alternative strategies in adapting
national laws to the challenges of global society. Simplistic legal
reform too often results from policies that are claimed to be necessary
55. See Wai, Commerce, Cooperation,Cosmopolitanism,supra note 36.
56. David Kennedy, The InternationalStyle in PostwarLaw and Policy, 1994 UTAH L.
REV. 7.
57. See, e.g., ROBERTO M. UNGER, FALsE NEcEssITY (1987).
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because of global conditions or because of the need to promote "the"
international system.
Liberal economic, political, and normative frameworks
identify policy dimensions for consideration, rather than determining
a necessary set of legal reforms for all cases. In practice, however,
internationalist reform based on these open-ended structures has not
been so pluralistic. Open-ended structures of policy argumentation
can take on an overstated determinacy and exclusion of policy
alternatives when placed in particular historical contexts such as the
sociological and ideational context of law reform in an era of neoliberalism, 58 or of a particular national tradition of liberal
internationalism.59
When situated in sociological and ideational contexts, the
partiality of internationalist policy argumentation partly explains why
the regulatory function is often obscured in current internationalist
reform of private international law. General policy objectives such as
commerce, cooperation, and cosmopolitan fairness derive their appeal
as primary objectives for the international system from their
60
seemingly uncontroversial basis in either consent or cooperation.
However, the lack of controversy about such policy goals is
overstated. First, these objectives are erroneously thought to decide
particular substantive disputes in private international law in a
determinate way, such as through support for rulings that enforce
arbitration clauses and arbitral awards. However, the same policy
objective is often indeterminate with respect to a number of different
kinds of doctrinal reform. 61 For example, it is far from clear whether

58. See, e.g., Robert Wai, The Commercial Activity Exception to Sovereign Immunity
and the Boundaries of Contemporary International Legalism, in TORTURE AS TORT:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL

HUMAN

RIGHTS

LITIGATION 213 (Craig Scott ed., 2001), at 239-45.

59. See, e.g., Wai, supra note 44.
60. I elaborate on the significance and the limits of ideas of consent and cooperative
benefit to internationalist policy reasoning with respect to a specific example from
international law in Wai, supra note 58, at 228-39.
61. This is a version of Oliver Wendell Holmes's general proposition: "General
propositions do not decide concrete cases." Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905)
(Holmes J., dissenting). A modem, critical understanding of policy reasoning in law as
overstated in its claims to determine legal implications has been best articulated by Duncan
Kennedy; see, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARv. L. REV. 1685 (1976) [hereinafter Kennedy, Form and Substance]; Duncan Kennedy,
The Structures of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205 (1979); Duncan
Kennedy, A Semiotics of Legal Argument, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 75 (1991); DUNCAN
KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIECLE, chs. 5-6 (1997). Specifically, with
respect to the limits of reasoning based on economic efficiency, see Duncan Kennedy &
Frank Michelman, Are Contract and Property Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711 (1980);
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more international transactions would occur in a situation where all
foreign judgments or arbitration awards were recognized and
enforced. It may be that, ex ante, parties prefer such certainty, but it
is equally possible that at least some parties would prefer less
oversight by national courts during the enforcement process. As yet
another alternative, some parties may prefer more flexibility for
dispute-resolution to adjust to a long-term changing relationship, for
62
example, through bilateral processes of negotiation or mediation.
Moreover, where there is a conflict among different policy objectives,
none of international commerce, cooperation, or cosmopolitan
fairness can select solutions among conflicting interests in a
determinative manner. Hence, the supposed non-controversial nature
of internationalist policy objectives is often overstated.
Second, internationalist policy reasoning in private
international law often narrows the range of policy objectives
considered appropriate for private international law. The goals of
commerce, cooperation, and cosmopolitan fairness are important, but
they can exclude other worthwhile policy objectives such as
distributive justice, democratic political governance, or effective
transnational regulation. It is important to demonstrate that objectives
such as effective regulation are as worthy as international objectives
such as promoting international commerce.
One way to state this challenge is to understand that the policy
goals of international commerce, interstate cooperation, and
cosmopolitan fairness do not exhaust the definition of an international
or cosmopolitan normative viewpoint. Rather, what policies advance
cosmopolitanism (and internationalism) is contested by different
groups with different agendas. In general, cosmopolitanism requires
a normative standpoint that includes the interests and values of
individuals and societies outside of a defined state's boundaries, but it
could involve a substantial commitment to a range of objectives that
would meet requirements of substantive and procedural justice. Thus
a cosmopolitan standpoint could go well beyond cosmopolitan
fairness or non-discrimination in the narrower sense of treating
foreign and domestic individuals alike. A truly cosmopolitan
approach to justice and order in the international system would
contemplate other objectives such as effective regulation or
Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L.

REV. 387 (1981).
62. This suggests an alternative idea of pluralism and self-governance among business
actors reflecting the spectrum of forms of alternative dispute resolution; see, eg., D. Paul
Emond, Introduction to Special Issue, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Consensus or

Confusion, 36 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 617 (Winter 1998).
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distributive fairness. It is this sense of a cosmopolitan viewpoint that
I use in the remainder of this Article in describing the challenge of
articulating an international and cosmopolitan policy defence for
using private international law to promote the effective regulation of
transnational private actors.
III.

THE ELUSIVE REGULATORY FUNCTION OF PRIVATE
63

INTERNATIONAL LAW

For the most part, international law discussions about
transnational regulation have focused on the possibilities for public
international law and institutions, in particular in functional subject
areas such as taxation or environmental regulation, and to some extent
in international trade law. Private law and private international law
have been largely ignored in discussions about international
regulation and international public policy. But it seems clear that the
private law foundations of the international economy must be
interrogated by those concerned about the regulatory consequences of
an international
system where transnational business conduct is
64
expanding.
A.

The TransnationalRegulatory Function of Domestic Private
Laws

Concern about the deregulatory impact of internationalist
reform in private international law is mainly premised on the
important regulatory functions of the underlying domestic private law
regimes.65 In the domestic context, it is well understood that there are
63.

Cf

Friedrich Juenger, Jurisdiction, Choice of Law and the Elusive Goal of

Decisional Harmony, in LAW AND REALITY: ESSAYS ON NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
PROCEDURAL LAW IN HONOUR OF CORNELIUS CAREL ALBERT VOSKUIL 137 (Mathilde

Sumampouw et al. eds., 1992) (criticizing the idea that decisional harmony should be the
overriding policy goal of private international law and arguing for an approach that promotes
substantive justice through, among other techniques, restricting generous jurisdictional rules).
64. E.g., Paul, Isolation, supra note 4; David Kennedy, A New World Order: Yesterday,
Today and Tomorrow, 4 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 329 (1994) [hereinafter
Kennedy, New World Order]; David Kennedy, Receiving the International, 10 CONN. J.
INT'L L. 1, 6 (1994); A.Claire Cutler, Global Capitalism and Liberal Myths: Dispute
Settlement in Private International Trade Relations, 24 MILLENNIUM: JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 377 (1995).
65. For the purposes of this Article, I distinguish regulatory concerns from distributive
concerns. Distributive concerns address underlying or created problems of inequality in the
distribution of the benefits of material goods or intangibles. The distributive concern is
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significant national, societal, and individual interests in regulating
conduct through private law, such as tort law.66 The approaches of
legal realism and critical legal studies have emphasized that the
private law rules of property, tort, and contract, as well as the laws of
corporations, commercial and financial transactions, insolvency, and
bankruptcy, are (a) necessary for the functioning of a "free" market
and (b) just as much matters of public policy as public law, regulation
or administrative interventions. 67 Regulatory concerns relate both to
the protection of third parties from externalities of business conduct
and to the regulation of conduct as between transacting actors.
1.

The Regulatory Function of Private Laws as the Protection of
Third Parties

The major regulatory concern addressed by private law
regimes is the protection of third parties from the harmful effects of
private transactions. While contractual relations are arguably the
result only of the voluntary interaction of consenting parties, many
kinds of harm with which private law is concerned involve nonconsenting third parties, whether they be individuals, social groups, or
other segments of society at large.
Economic analysis of law explains the regulatory concern as
primarily a problem of externalities. The distinction between private
fundamental to many critiques of the role of private law in domestic and global markets; see
Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and PaternalisticMotives in Contract and Tort Law, with
Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 VID. L. REv.
563 (1982). However, this Article is concerned with the negative impact of conduct of
certain parties on others, regardless of the underlying distributive consequences, although of
course such conduct will also have consequences for distribution of benefits.
66. This appreciation of the public policy importance of private international law is
central to the influential governmental interest analysis of choice of law in the United States.
See BRILMAYER, supra note 47, ch. 2.
67. Cass Sunstein summarizes this point by noting that:
The notion of "laissez-faire" is a grotesque misdescription of what free markets
actually require and entail. Free markets depend for their existence on law. We
cannot have a system of private property without legal rules, telling people who
owns what, imposing penalties for trespass, and saying who can do what to
whom. Without the law of contract, freedom of contract, as we know and live
it, would be impossible.... Moreover, the law that underlies free markets is
coercive in the sense that in addition to facilitating individual transactions, it
stops people from doing many things that they would like to do. This point is
not by any means a critique of free markets. But it suggests that markets should
be understood as a legal construct, to be evaluated on the basis of whether they
promote human interests, rather than as a part of nature and the natural order, or
as a simple way of promoting voluntary interactions.
CASS SuNsTEIN, FREE MARKERs AND SociAL JusTICE 5 (1997).
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costs and social costs is a central problem for policy-making in many
areas, and private law is no different in this respect. 68 A central
concern of law-making, in this view, is to structure incentives and
punishments such that private actors rationally act in a way that is
socially optimal. Through laws, some of the externalized costs will
be internalized by the private actor. A Coasean analysis might argue
that some forms of private bargaining may occur that help to
internalize social costs, but, as Sunstein suggests, these depend on a
number of conditions, including absence of transaction costs, wealth
effects, and endowment effects. 69 When these conditions are not met,
government intervention may be justified to help align private costs
with social costs.
The regulatory function of private law is sometimes hidden
because private law is often portrayed as primarily concerned with a
facilitative function. Through protection of property and contract
rights, it is argued that complex exchange and specialized production
will be possible. This kind of exchange and production is argued to
70
be optimal for all parties and for overall social welfare.
In addition to facilitation, however, private laws clearly serve
regulatory functions of deterring socially harmful or wasteful
conduct. The regulatory function of private and business law regimes
is demonstrated by the role of private law in the mixed regimes of
antitrust law and securities laws in the United States. While clearly
having a public institutional component, a major feature of the
antitrust regime is the existence of private remedies under the
Sherman Act, including the possibility of treble damages. 71 One
description of this system has been that it is a regime of "private
attorneys general. 72 U.S. securities laws are another grouping of
laws that have this mixed public and private character. While the
regime of securities regulation includes criminal laws and
administrative regulations, the securities laws also permit civil

68.

See generally ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 172-203 (4th ed.

1932); Ronald H. Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1960).
69. SuNsTEIN, supra note 67, at 248-52.
70. See Coase, supra note 68.
71. See PHILLIP AREEDA & Louis KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT,
CASES 83-104 (4th ed. 1988).
72. American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 826 (2d
Cir. 1968), cited in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. at
635.
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litigation by private actors seeking private remedies. 73 Indeed,
private litigants are "rewarded" for the social benefits they provide
through deterrence of antitrust or securities violations by virtue of
provisions such as treble damages awards. Such regimes of "public
laws with private remedies" are more unusual outside of the United
States. 74 However, these regimes show how nominally private laws
actually include broader regulatory objectives. Private party litigation
can have purposes and effects that extend much more broadly than to
just the interests of the parties to the litigation.
Although the U.S. reliance on "private" laws of antitrust and
securities regulation is unusual, most legal systems have private laws
of tort and delict that comprise a key part of the overall social
regulation in the relevant jurisdiction. 75 Tort law is used in most
jurisdictions as a means of providing compensation to injured parties
who are not in a contractual relation to the tortfeasor. In addition to
compensation of injured parties who bring tort suits, tort law also
aims to contribute (if imperfectly) to the general deterrence of many
kinds of socially-disfavored behavior. 76 Although tort law can be
understood as principally concerned with compensation to injured
individuals, tort law clearly also aims at the deterrence of behavior
that is viewed as immoral or as wasteful of society's scarce resources,

73. For an account of the arbitrability debate with respect to U.S. securities laws see
ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE QUEST FOR REASONABLENESS

215-18 (1996).
74. Id. at 223. Other jurisdictions such as the European Union and Canada have
adopted mixed regimes that contain more elements similar to the U.S. regulatory regimes,
notably in the area of competition law. See Daniela Caruso, The Missing View of the
Cathedral: The PrivateLaw Paradigm of EuropeanLegal Integration,3 EUR. L.J. 3, 17-22

(1997); see also United States of America v. Ivey, (1995) 139 D.L.R. 674, 689 (Ont. Gen.
Div.), aff'd (1996) 39 D.L.R. 570 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.) (characterizing environmental law as
another regime of mixed public and civil liability). Moreover, as a historical matter, the
regulation of competition via both private remedies, many developed in the common law, and
public statutes, such as the Statute of Monopolies, 1623, was already established in Britain
long before the U.S. Sherman Act. LORD WILBERFORCE, ALAN CAMPBELL & NEIL ELLES,
THE LAW OF RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES AND MONOPOLIES 17-44 (2d ed. 1966). The

British laws even contained precedents for the treble damages remedy. Id. at 23, n.18.
Nonetheless, the scope and extent of the current regimes of civil remedies remains less
expansive in non-U.S. jurisdictions than in the U.S. antitrust regime.
75. For a comparative description of U.S. and EC practice with respect to private law
remedies in consumer protection, see Geraint Howells & Thomas Wilhelmsson, EC and US
Approaches to Consumer Protection-Should the Gap Be Bridged? 17 Y.B. EmR. L. 207
(1997).
76. GuIDO CALABRESi, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

(1970).
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or both.77 Any internationalist reform that simply speaks of
"respecting party choice" ignores the obvious competing policies at
stake in the tort law system.
Even where public law and
administrative agencies are used to regulate, private laws such as tort
laws often remain central to effective regulation. Tort law in North
American jurisdictions, for example, clearly plays an important part
in social regulation of business conduct in such areas as
environmental law or consumer protection, each an area where there
is also administrative regulation and public law.
Even in contract law, which is often understood to be about
the interests of the two parties to the contract, regulation for thirdparty interests occurs. The common law of contract, for example,
treats as void contracts that are illegal or contrary to public policy. 78
The concern is that private agreements, even where consensually
negotiated between private parties, not be used to avoid the laws or
policies of the state. For example, common law contract doctrine has
long placed limits on the enforcement of contracts in restraint of
trade. 79 At least one rationale for this is that a competitive market
economy generates benefits to society, in particular to consumers. At
a deeper level, as well, the doctrines of contract law are formulated
with social objectives concerning the economy in mind. As Fuller
and Purdue famously argued, the underlying policy rationales for the
various measures of contract damages include the promotion of social
reliance on agreements. 80 This is another sense in which private
ordering through private law is understood as a social policy, one that
can be balanced against or subordinated when in conflict with other
81
policies.
77. Id. ch. 3. Calabresi's analysis emphasizes how even under purely economic criteria,
accident law is concerned with both specific and general deterrence in order to reduce the
total costs of accidents.
78. See, e.g., ANSON'S LAW OF CONTRACT, ch. 9 (Jack Beatson ed., 27th ed. 1998).
79. See generally MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE COMMON LAW OF RESTRAINT OF
TRADE: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1986).
80. Lon Fuller & William R. Purdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages,
46 YALE L.J. 52, 61 (1936).
Agreements can accomplish little, either for their makers or for society, unless
they are made the basis for action. When business agreements are not only
made but are also acted on, the division of labor is facilitated, goods find their
way to the places where they are most needed, and economic activity is
generally stimulated.
Id.
81. For example, labor relations in common law jurisdictions are regulated by
interrelated regimes of private law, collective bargaining law and statutory employment law.
See THE LABOUR LAW CASEBOOK GROUP, LABouR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES,

MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 1-2 (6th ed. 1998).
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Contract law is thought to be key to international transactions.
It seems to capture the ideal of promoting mutual promises in order to
facilitate mutually valuable transactions. However, even as between
the parties to transactions, private law adjudication plays a significant
"regulatory" role in seeking to ensure82that agreements achieve
fairness and justice as between the parties.
Critical scholars have argued that in addition to regulatory
purposes related to the impact of private transactions on third-party
interests, private law adjudication is often motivated by, and should
83
be motivated by, considerations as to fairness between the parties.
Most obvious are the private laws that are concerned with unfair
conditions under which agreements are formed. Doctrines of duress,
unconscionability, mistake, incapacity, and misrepresentation are
standard examples in contract law where private law imposes limits
on private ordering to ensure that basic conditions of voluntariness
and adequate information are met. 84 The imposition of compulsory
terms by legislatures and the limits on the enforcement of exclusion
clauses is a further example where private law rules clearly play a role
in regulating the contractual freedom of parties. The motives for such
contractual measures are various, and can include both concerns about
correcting for unequal power or inadequate information, and motives
of paternalism and distributive faimess.85
The role of these protective motives as between transacting
parties is especially significant in a transnational context with respect
to contractual provisions for choice of law, choice of forum, and
arbitration clauses. As a result of a lack of information, expertise, or
advice, many parties, such as consumers, 86 may not fully appreciate
87
the significance of such clauses when they appear in a contract.
82.

Singer, Real Conflicts, supra note 4, at 41-42; Kennedy, Receiving the

International, supra note 64. Of course, contract law often fails in these aspirations,
especially in the actual practice of contract law litigation. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Why the
"Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits ofLegal Change, 9 L. & SOC'Y REv.

95 (1974).
83. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 65.
84. See, e.g., MIcHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE Lnvi-rs OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1993).
85. Kennedy, supra note 65.
86. See generally, lain Ramsay, Consumer Protection in the Era of Informational
Capitalism,in CONSUMER LAW INTHE INFORMAnON SOCIETY 45 (Thomas Wilhelmsson et al.

eds., 2000).

87. Some of the starkest examples of such transnational issues occur in on-line
contracts, where a party can agree, with a click of the mouse, to a series of contractual
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This concern is partly recognized, for example, in the preliminary
draft of the Hague Conference convention on jurisdiction and
recognition of judgments, which excludes both consumer 88 and
employment contracts 8990 from the general provision that supports
forum-selection clauses.
Identifying the potential protective functions of contract law
should not obscure the fact that private law has not always effectively
served those functions. In many areas, public law has been necessary
to correct for these deficiencies. Various forms of statutes expressly
identify regulatory and public policy purposes and implement special
regulatory regimes that tailor the contract formation process, its terms
and its effects to reflect more systemic concerns about contractual
transactions of parties in particular sectors. Standard examples
include consumer protection statutes 91 and collective bargaining and
employment laws. 92 As will be discussed below, the difficulty of
transferring these public laws to the international level is one of the
fundamental challenges for transnational regulation.
Once private law rules are seen to involve fundamental
decisions that regulate the behavior of parties for the benefit of all of
the parties, third parties, and society at large, the potential for real
conflicts across jurisdictions expands significantly. 93
This is
especially so when one factors in disagreement among jurisdictions as
to the preferred level and form of regulation. Coordination among
different regimes of private law becomes a significant challenge, and
the consequent gaps create potential opportunities for transnational
business actors to escape regulatory oversight.

provisions that include jurisdiction, arbitration, or choice of law clauses. See, e.g., Roger
Brownsword & Geraint Howells, When Surfers Start to Shop: Internet Commerce and
ContractLaw, 19 LEGAL STuD. 287 (1999); James Gleick, It's Your Problem (Not Theirs),
N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, May 10, 1998.
88. Preliminary Draft Convention, supra note 25, art. 7.
89. Preliminary Draft Convention, supra note 25, art. 8.
90. Preliminary Draft Convention, supra note 25, art. 4.
91. P.S. ATIYAH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CoNTRAcT 25 (5th ed. 1995);
Howells & Wilhelnsson, supra note 75.
92. LABOUR LAW CASEBOOK GROUP, supra note 81.
93. Singer, Real Conflicts, supra note 4.

239

2002]

TRANSNATIONAL LIFTOFFAND JURIDICAL TOUCHDOWN

B.

The Regulatory Function in TraditionalPrivateInternational
Law

In the arguments justifying reform in private international law,
traditional private international law is often characterized as being a
parochial and conservative field, out-of-touch with the contemporary
sociological and normative realities of a global society.94 Recent
internationalist reform is then presented as based on progressive
reform of traditional rules in light of the contemporary importance of
promoting shared international policy objectives pertaining to
commerce, international cooperation, and cosmopolitan
international
95
fairness.
This Part of the Article will argue that the understanding of
private international law as parochial and regressive is misleading. In
traditional private international law, deference to the domestic state
sovereign was not simply a matter of formalism about sovereignty or
simple parochialism with respect to national interests. Rather, the
supremacy of the municipal in traditional private international law
served the purpose of advancing cosmopolitan policy interests, such
as effective regulation or democratic control, because these values
were understood to be best protected through domestic laws and
In more recent internationalist reform, the
institutions.
internationalist values such as commerce and comity have been
identified as important policy values in conflict with domestic
sovereignty. The problem is that, in the proposed reforms, the policy
objectives and functions that the domestic sovereign was expected to
protect, such as effective regulation, have not been adequately
recognized and protected. It is necessary to consider regulatory
functions directly as part of the new internationalist perspective.
To better understand the difficulties of articulating a
cosmopolitan regulatory viewpoint in private international law, this
Part describes some historical aspects of the expression of
internationalist objectives in private international law. The historical
context of a field such as private international law in the common law
shows that the underlying policy concerns of the area are too complex
for such simplistic characterizations as internationalist or parochial.
This complex history also demonstrates the challenge of articulating a
94. See, e.g., Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 (Can.), at
1095.
95. This rhetoric of internationalist reform oriented against an excessively sovereigntist
traditional legal order is a recurring trope throughout the history of public international law.
See Kennedy, New World Order,supra note 64.
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of private

The Influential Structures of Public Policy Argumentation in
Public International Law

One way to understand how the structure of policy
argumentation in private international law may obscure the regulatory
function is to begin with the influential and more familiar structure of
policy argumentation in public international law. Scholars like
Koskenniemi trace the presence at all levels in public international
law-in sources, process, substance, cases, and legal theories-of a
fundamental tension between national sovereignty and international
society. 96 Koskenniemi labels the relevant structures the descending
(sovereigntist) and ascending (world society) arguments. In legal
argumentation in public international law, the descending argument
focuses on the importance of state consent; the ascending argument,
in turn, focuses on the universal benefits of a global community.
Koskenniemi observes that, in practice, international law rarely
provides substantive resolution of this tension. Instead, there is an
endless process of argumentation pitting the one tendency against the
other. 97
Although Koskenniemi does not associate a political valence
with each argumentative structure, the ascending internationalist
structure is more readily associated with progressivism in
international law circles. 98
The "utopian" label attached by
Koskenniemi to this structure is indicative of this implicit connection.
Sovereigntist conceptions, in contrast, while realistic, are somehow
tarnished as concessions to the parochialism of realpolitik; those who
argue for state sovereignty are labeled "apologist" for the existing
state of affairs. On this point, Kennedy argues that progressivism in
international law has been identified with the notion that things
function better when they are done intemationally. 99

96. MARTTn
KOSKENNIEMI,
FROM APOLOGY
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (1989).

TO

UTOPIA:

THE

STRUCTURE

OF

97. Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics ofInternationalLaw, I EuR. J. INT'L L. 4, 28-29
(1990). Koskenniemi proceeds to provide examples of such structures of argumentation in
the areas of transborder pollution, nationalization of foreign investments and national selfdetermination. Id. at 29-3 1.
98. See, e.g., Kennedy, New World Order,supra note 64, at 335-41.
99. Id at 336.
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While this identification
of internationalist-oriented
institutional and legal reforms as progressive can be misleading in the
context of public international law, it is clearly problematic in the
context of private international law. In particular, two significant
differences between private international law and public international
law seem to limit the application of this normative valence of reform
in private international law. First, private international law has
remained primarily the domain of national laws and national
institutions, rather than international treaties and international courts.
Second, the conception of public interest and progressivism has not
been as readily attached to the ascending argument in the field of
private international law as it has been in public international law;
instead it has been identified with national laws and institutions.
2.

The Regulatory Function in Traditional Private International
Law: Deference to the Municipal

The regulatory function of traditional1 ° ° private international
law in the common law tradition is obscured by the manner in which
the function is expressed: through deference to municipal laws. In
contrast to public international law, private international law is not10 a1
field that is unsure of its sources or its status as municipal law.
Moreover, traditional conflict of laws emphasized a strongly
100. By traditional private international law, I mean the largely positivist, modem
traditions associated with Joseph Story and Albert Venn Dicey in the common law. In earlier
periods, many theories related to subjects of private international law were international or
transnational in their conception and sources; examples of these theories are found in the
traditions of Romanjus gentium, the Statutists and the natural law. See, e.g., MARTIN WOLFF,
PRivATE INTERNATIONAL LAWv 19-29 (1945). For an introduction to these complex debates
concerning the early periods of private international law, see Nikitas Hatzimihail, On
Mapping the Conceptual Battlefield of PrivateInternationalLaw, 13 HAGUE Y.B. INT'L L.
57 (2000). Hatzimihail argues that in some civilian traditions of private international law,
such as that discussed in the work of Mancini and the "Latin" school, there remain
internationalist conceptions of the subject. In this Part, I argue that international or
cosmopolitan interests do form a part of the common law tradition of private international
law, but that they are expressed in indirect ways. Clearly, the challenge facing a
cosmopolitan articulation of the regulatory function in the civil law tradition may be different
because of the different styles of policy argumentation.
101. DIcEY & MORRIS, supra note 3, at 3, for example, open their treatise with the
definitive assertion that:
The branch of English Law known as the conflict of laws is that part of the law
of England which deals with cases having a foreign element. By a 'foreign
element' it is meant simply a contact with some system of law other than
English law.
Some earlier civilian conceptions of the field, such as that of Savigny, did view private
international law as having an international basis.
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territorial definition of sovereignty that prioritized the policy
objectives and interests of the state in which the court sat.
It is inaccurate, however, to view the underlying conceptions
of traditional private international law as being relentlessly parochial
in orientation.
Rather, internationalist policy goals, including
objectives such as international commerce and international comity
were already present as policy values in the traditional conception of
private international law. Such international considerations were
argued for indirectly, through arguments such as the claim that
respecting these values would actually serve the long-run interests of
the forum state. For example, both Huber 10 2 and Story 10 3 defended
respect for comity not on the basis that it was an absolute moral or
legal duty, but because of its utility to all states.
These
internationalist policy objectives were also served by a number of
rules and approaches, such as the vested rights approach of Dicey 10 4
and of Beale, 10 5 which used jurisdiction-selecting rules based on a
number of characteristics of an action, de-emphasized the direct
consideration of domestic interests, and so permitted at least some
internationalist considerations. 10 6 While private international law
placed internationalist objectives as secondary to the priority of
domestic sovereign authority, or hid them under the doctrinal rules,
the values were not unprotected. Therefore, it is inaccurate to argue
that traditional private international law was simply parochial in its
policy orientation.
102. Huber adopted a similar approach to comity. His third general maxim qualified his
strongly territorial conception of private international law by stating that:
Those who exercise sovereign authority so act from comity that the laws of each
nation having been applied within its own boundaries should retain their effect
everywhere so far as they do not prejudice the power or rights of another state
or its subjects.
Ulrich Huber, De Conflictu Legum (1689), translatedin D.J. Llewelyn Davies, The Influence
ofHuber's De Conflictu Legum on English PrivateInternationalLaw, 18 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
49, 65 (1937).
103. In JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 34 (1934), Story
defends comity as based on laws
which arise from mutual interest and utility, from a sense of the inconveniences,
which would result from a contrary doctrine, and from a sort of moral necessity
to do justice, in order that justice may be done to us in return.
104. ALBERT VENN DICEY, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE TO THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1896).
105. JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935).
106. A choice of law rule in real property, for example, that rigidly selected the lex situs
would limit the ability of a forum other than the situs to favor parochial considerations.
Although these rules were justified as being neutral doctrine or driven by fairness rather than
anti-parochialism, they effectively resulted in some limits on parochialism. Formalism has
its complex uses. Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 61.
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The supremacy of the municipal in traditional private
international law also served the purpose of advancing policy interests
such as effective regulation of private relations, protection of social
interests, and legal diversity. These are also cosmopolitan values, but
values that were understood to be best protected through domestic
laws and institutions. For example, David Bederman characterizes
nineteenth century private international law as a complex public
policy compromise where "[tihe specific demands of public policy,
not generalized notions regarding sovereignty, animated the
'domestication' of private international law by declaring municipal
law supreme." 10 7 Bederman argues that, in the process of the
development of this compromise, two things occurred: (1) the triumph
of the view that private international law was unquestionably
municipal law with no public international law limits and (2) the
simultaneous development of doctrines, based on theoretical
underpinnings including comity, commerce, and vested rights, that
allowed for application of foreign law, such as the lex loci delicti rule
in tort.
The priority of the municipal over the international in private
international law influenced very much the manner in which public
policy goals were advanced and argued in private international law.
Public policy goals certainly could be advanced, but they had to be
argued as domestic public policy. Domestic public policy goals and
interests indeed were accorded the highest priority under the
traditional conflict of laws. This is sometimes overlooked because
private international law is often concerned with private transactions.
Several characteristics of traditional private international law
reveal this priority of domestic public policy. First, the courts
deferred to any constitution, statute, or implemented international
convention that changed the rules of the conflict of laws. 10 8 Second,
the courts refused to enforce any foreign law or judgment that was
repugnant to domestic public policy. 10 9 Third, the courts would not
enforce foreign criminal, revenue, or regulatory laws. 110 Courts held
that criminal, revenue, and regulatory laws were the domain of the
domestic legislature, and if there were to be such enforcement of

107. David Bederman, Compulsory Pilotage, Public Policy and the Early Private
InternationalLaw of Torts, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1033, 1092 (1990).
108. See DIcEY & MORRIs, supra note 3, at 7-26, for a discussion on the role of statutes
and international conventions.

109. Id. at 88-96.
110. Id.at97-108.

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

4
[40:209

foreign laws, there should be specific direction from the domestic
legislature.
This configuration of policy debate in private international law
helps to explain the current pattern of policy argumentation over
internationalist reform. One consequence of the historical features of
private international law is that the municipal became identified as the
appropriate source for most progressive public policy, such as
regulation and redistribution.
Furthermore, arguments for the
application of foreign law and the consideration of foreign interests
had to be linked to policies that could be defended on the grounds that
they were in the long-term best interests of the forum. This latter
requirement has meant that internationalist policy arguments in
private international law have tended to focus on promoting
seemingly uncontroversial international public policies-such as
increasing international commerce, international cooperation, and
comity-rather than objectives such as effective regulation or equity,
which were left to be protected by individual states.
C.

Regulatory Considerationsand the Problem of Parochial
Progressivism

Because traditional private international law theories only
indirectly protected regulatory objectives-primarily through
deference to municipal concerns-internationalist reform efforts
understate as policy values effective regulation, creative conflict, and
diversity of national laws. Contemporary policy argumentation seems
unable to recognize this because the goals of commerce, cooperation
and cosmopolitan fairness are justified as providing mutually
beneficial, uncontroversial benefits to all jurisdictions in the
system. 111 In contrast, courts and legislators seem to view regulatory
or distributive concerns as being more problematic because there is
significant potential for disagreement among different jurisdictions.
Moreover, the primary concern of internationalist reform has been to
control for the threat that municipal actors will make parochial
decisions that ignore foreign interests and that defeat international
political and economic cooperation.

111. I elaborate on the appeal of ideas of consent and cooperation in Wai, supra note 58,
at 228-39.
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The progression of U.S. theories of the conflict of laws
demonstrates some of the hazards of parochialism in defending
regulatory interests. The traditional vested rights theory tended to be
formalist in its focus on the vesting and enforcement of individual
rights and its denial of the degree to which conflict of laws involved
the substantive public policy goals of different jurisdictions. 112 The
critical fire of legal realism was directed against this subterfuge
concerning the impact of private international law on domestic public
policy. 113 In doing so, however, the realists were also undermining
the potentially more cosmopolitan effects of the rights-based
conception of private international law developed by Dicey and
Beale. This need not have been so if judicial and scholarly
conceptions of national interest had been able to generate a
conception of public interest that included the interests of those
outside of the forum. However, this is not what occurred.
The manner in which the post-realist approach to conflict of
laws in the United States turned against cosmopolitanism is most
evident in the rise and development of the governmental interest
analysis as a significant U.S. approach to choice of law.1 14 Judicial
reasoning about choice of law, at least in theory, considered the
relevant substantive interests of each jurisdiction in the resolution of a
matter. In the case of "real conflicts" between jurisdictions, where
each jurisdiction had an interest in application of its law, a forum was
to apply its own law. 115 Not surprisingly, it was easy to find a forum
policy interest in virtually every kind of private law. 116 Baxter's
more refined approach, based on a "comparative impairment"
assessment of the relative interests at stake in conflict of law
112. BEALE, supra note 105; RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934). In the First

Restatement, examples of jurisdiction-selecting rules include choice of law rules for contract
(e.g. § 332) that select the law of the place of the contract (§ 311) and choice of law rules for
tort (e.g. § 378) that select the law of the place of the wrong (§ 377).
113. Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33
YALE L.J. 457 (1924); Ernest G. Lorenzen, Territoriality,Public Policy and the Conflict of
Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 736 (1924); David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice of law Problem,

47 HARv. L. REv. 173 (1933).
114. Governmental interest analysis is most commonly identified with the work of
Brainerd Currie. See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1963). For commentary see BRILMAYER, supra note 47, ch.2.
115. CURRIE,supranote114, at 183.
116. See Singer, Real Conflicts, supra note 4, at 35-47, for an explanation of how
conflicting state and individual interests should be analyzed.
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problems, did not find much favor. 117 Instead, and partly for reasons
of separation of power concerns for legislative priorities, U.S. courts
tended to find
a forum interest and thus direct application of the
118
forum law.
The progressive inheritors of this system have generally
argued that internationalist reforms pose threats to regulatory
objectives on the basis that national laws best protect regulatory
concerns. For example, Louise Weinberg advocates that comity be
abandoned and forum law be applied in virtually all circumstances.
Her confidence partly comes from her pro-plaintiff orientation, which
sees that in the play of interaction among different jurisdictions, the
aggressive application of forum law will lead to the highest level of
tort liability. Comity will undermine what she believes are the most
important values:
[N]ationwide or even worldwide, of the safety and
security of the shared environment, of the fairness of
the national or world securities markets, of the safety
of markets for crops and manufacturers, and of the
safety of international or interstate transportation
19
networks, and other services delivery systems.1
The assumption that U.S. forum law remains the most
progressive is reflected even in the best critical scholarship. For
example, in a broad-ranging attack on the various uses of the comity
doctrine in U.S. conflict of laws, Joel Paul criticizes comity for
obscuring "the real political conflicts between sovereigns and
[making] it difficult to address those tensions directly."' 20 He
identifies a host of general problems, including regulatory
competition, with comity. Paul also fears that the broad conception of
comity with respect to foreign laws and foreign courts is deregulatory
because it provides "an opportunity for a foreign or domestic party to
opt out of U.S. regulation." 2 1 Instead of comity, Paul advocates
117. William Baxter, Choice of Law and the FederalSystem, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1963).
For commentary, see William H. Allan & Erin A. O'Hara, Second Generation Law and
Economics of Conflict ofLaws: Baxter's ComparativeImpairmentand Beyond, 51 STAN. L.
REv. 1011 (1999) and Joel Trachtman, Conflict of Laws and Accuracy in the Allocation of
Government Responsibility, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 975 (1994).
118. For a discussion of the importance of separation of powers concerns to U.S. conflict
of laws issues, see GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES
COURTs 22-24 (3d ed. 1996).
119. Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEO. L.J. 53, 71 (1991).
120. Paul, Comity, supra note 4, at 55.
121. Id. at 71, citing The MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co, 407 U.S. at 9; Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614; In Re Union Carbide
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international coordination of regulatory policies and the
harmonization of conflict of law principles. In the absence of such
coordination or harmonization, however, Paul supports the abolition
of comity, the strong deference of domestic courts towards domestic
legislation and public policy, and vigorous extraterritorial application
of U.S. law.
2.

The Dangers of Parochialism in Defending Regulatory
Concerns

The analysis by progressive scholars like Paul and Weinberg
displays a troubling parochialism. First, their analyses reflect an
inability to imagine situations where application of a foreign law or
procedure may be more amenable to progressive purposes, such as
high standards of regulation, than the U.S. law or process.
Consequently, Paul and Weinberg seem unable to give credit to those
internationalist reforms, such as liberalized recognition and
enforcement, which may actually improve the application of private
laws with higher regulatory content.
Attacks on comity are troubling when they seem to presume
that the source of the injustice would invariably be a foreign
jurisdiction. 122 There may be many sets of laws that, while not
identical to U.S. laws, would nonetheless achieve substantial justice
to the parties. Indeed, the foreign law may be more progressive from
a regulatory view. 123 For most foreigners, the presumption that the
laws of the United States have struck either the best or the most
progressive balance, especially in areas of social legislation, seems
hasty.
The progressive critiques of comity by Paul and Weinberg
demonstrate little concern that denial of comity would disrupt the
policy balances in jurisdictions that set a different regulatory level or
Corporation Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December, 1984, 634 F. Supp. 842
(S.D.N.Y. 1986); affid, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987).
122. There is also the danger that such approaches fail to carefully analyze the particular
law and facts at issue but instead invite judicial actors to use problematic stereotypes of the
"other" as the source of offensive values. Weinberg, for example, sets up as representative of
the problems of comity the failure to enforce Title VII protection of a U.S. worker in Saudi
Arabia, problematically invoking the specter of Arab anti-Semitism and sex discrimination.
See Weinberg, supranote 119, at 74-75.
123. A similar concern about the substance of the applicable law regardless of its
jurisdictional source animates Robert Leflar's "better law" critique of Currie's interest
analysis. See Robert Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice Influencing Considerations,54
CAL. L. REv. 1584 (1966). For a commentary, see BRILMAYER, supra note 47, § 2.2.2.
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which rely less on tort litigation as a regulatory tool. In this respect, a
broader sense of comity by U.S. courts might assist regulatory
purposes by permitting recognition of progressive public regulation
statutes of foreign jurisdictions. 124 In addition, the absence of a law
often does not indicate a lack of an underlying policy purpose, 125
but
rather a deliberate and considered policy decision to limit liability.
Weinberg's parochial presumption is especially a problem
when it is translated into a rule that always enforces forum law.
Given the number of jurisdictions where U.S. companies and persons
operate, the idea that U.S. courts should simply apply U.S. forum
rules seems a threatening form of extraterritoriality by the dominant
state in the contemporary international system. The significance of
U.S. regulators and courts in the international market, moreover,
makes the state of U.S. conflict of law rules and their enforcement of
particular importance to foreign jurisdictions.
An aggressive
extraterritorial application of U.S. laws in areas such as tort and
antitrust, where the United States is already perceived abroad to be
aggressive, will lead to a reputation as a judicial bully, and may lead
foreign authorities to refuse to enforce judgments from that bully's
jurisdiction. 126 Foreign legislative action may fight extraterritoriality
through devices such as clawback and blocking statutes to combat the
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law. Like the English
internationalists of the nineteenth century, Weinberg may be relying
on the economic and military power of the U.S. to encourage
acquiescence by foreign jurisdictions, especially since foreign private
parties frequently pay a big price for being excluded from United
States markets. 127 However, this approach is empirically uncertain
and normatively repugnant to other jurisdictions; it will invite noncooperation, ill-will, and even open antagonism. A reciprocal foreign
move to shut down the use of comity or equivalent doctrines will also
harm the potential force of progressive judgments from the United
States in foreign jurisdictions.

124. Cf. LOWENFELD, supra note 73, at 17-22; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 (1987) (introducing criteria of reasonableness
into the refusal to enforce the public regulations of other jurisdictions).
125. Singer, Real Conflicts, supra note 4, at 39-42.
126. Indicative is the reaction of the lower British Columbia court to aggressive Texas
courts in Amchem Products Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Board),
[1993] 1 S.C.R. 897 (Can.).
127. See Weinberg, supra note 119, for confidence that laws favoring plaintiffs will
become the norm of the land. Other jurisdictions may decline jurisdiction, but the aggressive
will triumph because of the operation of liberal recognition and enforcement rules which
lessen review of any judgments made by the aggressive state.
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Finally, progressive critiques that do not more carefully
distinguish among different cases too readily ignore the separate
value of respecting the social decisions and functioning of other
societies. Singer has persuasively criticized the view that the forum
should simply adopt conflict rules that further the goals of its
substantive laws. 128 Singer argues that a forum must have a
"multistate" concern about appropriate tolerance and respect for the
129
choices of other normative and political communities.
In sum, the most recent iteration of the comity debate in the
United States seems an unfortunate replay of earlier manifestations of
the internationalist-domestic debate. Critics of internationalist reform
in private international law too often fall into the well-worn lines of
protectionist logic from international trade or collective security
debates. The disclosure of the critics' parochial alternatives and
biases remains the strongest argument for equally problematic
internationalist reform. The resulting challenge for addressing the
regulatory function of contemporary private international law recalls a
familiar difficulty from international trade law: navigating between
free trade internationalism and progressive parochialism. Critiques of
the international policy objective of free trade are weakened because
valid concerns-such as protection of non-trade regulatory policies-1 30
are interspersed with questionable protectionist motives.
Consequently, it is difficult to argue for alternative rules and policies
that reflect a cosmopolitan public policy viewpoint, wherein topics
such as regulation can be advanced as proper goals for
internationalists and cosmopolitans to support in the private
international law regime. In the final part of this Article, I attempt to
articulate the contours of such a view with respect to the regulatory
function of private international law.

128. See Singer, Real Conflicts, supra note 4, at 85-86 & n.245, discussing Mary Jane
Morrison, Death of Conflicts, 29 VILL. L. REv. 313 (1983-4).
129. Singer, Real Conflicts, supra note 4, at 85-89.

130. This tension lies behind the central debates in interpretation of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and other international trade agreements over how to
address issues of de facto discrimination under provisions requiring National Treatment
(article II) and Most-Favored-Nation Treatment (article I) of "like products," as well as how
to deal with domestic regulatory policies that have a detrimental effect on trade liberalization.
See generally JAGDISH BHAGWATI & ROBERT HUDEC, FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION:
PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? (1996).
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ARTICULATING A COSMOPOLITAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE

REGULATORY FUNCTION OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION

This Part attempts to elaborate from a cosmopolitan public
policy perspective some of the challenges for regulatory objectives
posed by a liftoff of transnational business conduct and disputeresolution and the demise of domestic private law regulation. The
search for a cosmopolitan public policy viewpoint in private
international law reform parallels efforts by scholars in a number of
fields to articulate a cosmopolitan or transnational viewpoint that
would acknowledge both the importance of local communities
and the
131
significance of many kinds of transnational connections.
A.

The Problems of TransnationalCooperation

There are a number of reasons to believe that there is
suboptimal "under-regulation" at the transnational level.
In
particular, there are problems related to lack of cooperation due to the
anarchic nature of the international system in which there is no
overarching enforcement authority to coordinate and administer
regulation.' 3 2
Of several obstacles to international regulatory
coordination, the most fundamental in terms of the transnational
liftoff of business networks relates to regulatory gaps. In addition, the
fragmented nature of the international system increases the possibility
of harmful regulatory competition among jurisdictions.
As the favored method of addressing transnational regulatory
concerns, internationalists look to intemational-level solutions such as
international treaties, institutions, or cooperation dedicated to the
particular regulatory concern, such as environmental protection. The
problems arise when there is no such first-best solution. Where there
is no comprehensive multilateral agreement, problems of regulatory
gaps and regulatory competition may mean that the next-best
alternative is regulation by domestic regulatory regimes, including
private laws.
131. See, e.g., Donald Lenihan & Will Kymlicka, Reforming Our Political Discourse:
The NationalInterest in a Transnational World, 5 CONST. F. 49 (1994); Note, Constructing
the State Extraterritorially: Jurisdictional Discourse, The National Interest, and
TransnationalNorms, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1273 (1990) [hereinafter Note, Constructing the
State Extraterritorially];Katherine Stone, Labor and the Global Economy: FourApproaches
to TransnationalLaborRegulation, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 987 (1995).
132.

HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARcHIcAL SocIETY 46 (1977).
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A foundational problem for international law scholarship has
been "regulatory gaps." Regulatory gaps arise in the structure of the
contemporary international system where there are transnational
133
problems, but few or inadequate international regulatory bodies.
Environmental problems such as acid rain or the maintenance of fish
stocks are commonly cited as examples of transnational problems that
are under-regulated as a result of the decentralized or anarchic nature
of the international system. Many of these issues involve problems of
externalities-the ability of a private actor, such as a polluter, or a
state whose interests are aligned with that actor, to act so as to impose
some of the costs of their activities on others. The result is that not all
of the social costs of an action are internalized into the cost-benefit
assessment of the actor. 134 A related problem is with the "positive
externalities" of public goods. Such public goods involve the
activities of one actor that have benefits for others, but for which the
actor is unable to prevent "free-riding" by internalizing some of that
benefit. The result is a collective action problem in which suboptimal
production of public goods occurs, from the point of view of society
as a whole. A liberal international trading order is arguably a public
good of this kind.
Much state intervention, including through public and private
law, is intended to remedy problems of externalities and public goods.
In the international context, however, there is no equivalent
overarching authority that can enforce a policy to remedy externalities
and to ensure cooperative production of public goods. International
cooperation, even in the absence of such an overarching authority, can
itself be viewed as a type of public good. 135 The problem is that it is
difficult to generate a common international standard of regulation
that is optimal because of free-riding by states that see the advantage
133. See Kennedy, New World Order, supra note 64, at 371-73. Joel Trachtman has
recently referred to the regulatory gap through the idea of "underlaps" in regulatory coverage
that "make possible regulatory arbitrage, avoidance or evasion." See Joel Trachtman,
Externalitiesand Extraterritoriality The lav and economics ofprescriptivejurisdiction, in
ECONOMIC

DIMENSIONS

IN

INTERNATIONAL

LAW:

COMPARATIVE

AND

EMPIRICAL

PERSPECTIES 642, 643 (Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Alan D. Sykes eds. 1997).
134. This is the basic insight behind the neoclassical welfare economics for public
intervention. The classic exposition of the idea of externalities and public goods in
neoclassical economics is PIGOU, supra note 68. For a brief commentary, see ROGER
BACKHOUSE, A HISTORY OF MODERN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 165-66, 315-17 (1985). For one
strand of contemporary critique of Pigouvian ideas of social cost and a reconception on the
basis of transactions costs, see Coase, supra note 68; RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE
MARKET AND THE LAW (1988) [hereinafter COASE, THE FIRM].
135. See, e.g., BRILMAYER, supra note 47, at 169-218.
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of cheating when other states respect an international standard.
Moreover, national regulators are usually more concerned with
protecting interests in their own jurisdiction than with protecting
interests abroad, and so domestic laws and regulatory standards may
not reflect harms to foreign interests. Finally, states often genuinely
disagree with each other about standards and obligations, as well as
mechanisms for the effective enforcement of international rules.
International business actors are often adept at operating in, and
indeed taking advantage of, decentralized international markets where
there are gaps and conflicts among national regulatory regimes. Even
in areas of economic regulation such as antitrust or banking, national
regulators have not been able to coordinate 136their regulation of
international and transnational business conduct.
Regulatory overlap is also a possibility in a decentralized
system of regulatory jurisdiction. 137 In particular, the willingness of
state legislatures and state courts to expand extraterritorial jurisdiction
could mean that an "excessive" layer of regulation would occur. Two
or more national jurisdictions might be willing and able to regulate,
with the result that business actors might be subject to an excessive
level of regulatory oversight or may be subject to conflicting
regulatory demands. There are, however, a number of reasons to
believe that regulatory gaps are more common than regulatory
overlaps in the current international system. There may be a
collective action problem in which the interests harmed by lack of
regulatory protection are too dispersed to motivate any particular
national legislature to take action1 38 In contrast, the costs of overregulation are visited on specific actors who have the incentive to act
and lobby for changes. In the antitrust context, William S. Dodge
argues that the lack of coordinated regulatory authority and the lack
of representation in national legislatures of all the parties impacted by
anticompetitive business conduct will lead to "systematic underregulation." 139 National legislatures will systematically fail to
provide adequate regulatory coverage because they lack sufficient
political incentives to regulate international business activity that have
harmful effects on foreigners. Moreover, they may permit domestic
136. See, e.g., ETHAN KAPSTEIN, GOVERNING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: INTERNATIONAL
FINANCE AND THE STATE (1994).
137. See Trachtman, supra note 133, at 43.
138. Collective action problems are generally considered to be more severe as the
numbers of participants to be coordinated increases. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS, ch. 2 (1965).
139. William S. Dodge, Extraterritorialityand Conflict-of-Laws Theory, 39 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 101, 153 (1998).
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businesses to engage in activities
that "benefit domestic interests at
140
interests."
foreign
of
expense
the
The basic role of private international law in addressing
transnational regulatory gaps is to coordinate the process of regulation
by national authorities and national laws. In particular, private
international law rules help to determine when parties injured by the
transnational activity of actors can make complaints under national
legal regimes. This is perhaps best demonstrated by the rules of
jurisdiction and choice of law concerning tort law.
Tort law is the major form of private law that attempts to
address regulatory gaps by permitting affected individuals to sue
actors that seek to externalize costs onto others. 14 1 The problem in
the transnational context is that the affected individuals are often not
all within the same jurisdiction. Moreover, transaction costs and
other coordination problems are more severe across borders. The
result is that many actions are never commenced and, when they are,
national courts have difficulty determining in which forum interests
are to be protected. If injured parties are able to claim a legal remedy,
for example through class actions in a U.S. court, then the problem of
regulatory gaps is partly addressed. This does not occur if a foreign
court declines jurisdiction. Similarly, the choice by a forum court to
apply foreign law will lower regulatory oversight if the domestic law
provides more expansive regulatory protection. This might often be
the case, given that a more favorable forum law is often a reason for
the plaintiffs choice of a forum. Overall, however, it seems likely
that courts have tended to underestimate the role of national courts
and national tort laws in addressing regulatory concerns for foreign
interests.
Because private international law rules are important to
determining whether state-based regulation will occur (whether that
be sufficient regulation or over-regulation), the internationalist reform
of such rules may very much effect the overall level of regulation.
Liberalized recognition and enforcement or more expansive
assumption of jurisdiction by state courts may assist in the regulatory
oversight of transnational activity by national laws. In contrast,
greater use of doctrines of forum non conveniens to grant stays of
proceedings may reduce overall regulatory standards. Similarly,
arbitration clauses, forum-selection clauses, and choice of law clauses
140. Id. at 153.
141. Tort law can also become a tool for the protection of advantages, legitimate or
illegitimate; for example, defamation suits or the threat of such suits by business actors
against their critics.
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may result in under-regulation if there is insufficient consideration of
the limits on the power and knowledge of contracting parties such as
consumers.
In addition, while deference to foreign laws would not seem to
have a determinate deregulatory tendency, some critics claim that
there is a bias in the types of laws to which courts defer. One claimed
bias is that the extraterritorial application of national laws is limited to
business and economic laws, while national regulatory laws remain
imprisoned within national boundaries. Internationalist critics note
that the long-established rule against enforcement of foreign penal,
revenue, or other public laws remains, even in an era where the laws
on the enforcement of foreign judgments in civil and commercial
matters has been much eased. 42 From a more critical perspective, for
example, there seems to be a bias in the extraterritorial application of
U.S. laws by U.S. courts towards application of commercial laws but
against an application of social laws such as employment
discrimination statutes. 143
Paul, for example, argues that by
emphasizing the policy of protecting bargained-for expectations, the
courts privilege the interests of those who trade and invest against the
interests of consumers and small investors. 144 Whatever the cause,
the common concern is that internationalist reform in private
international law has only advanced comity and deference in contexts
that promote commercial interests.
2.

Regulatory Competition

A second challenge for those concerned with effective
regulation is regulatory competition in an international system where
private actors are able to move from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in
order to find the most favorable regulatory climate.145 In this
situation, not only will private actors slip through the "gaps" of a
fragmented regulatory regime, but through actual movement abroad,
or threats of such movement, economic producers may also generate
pressure on individual jurisdictions to lower domestic regulatory
standards below what they would otherwise have been. This can be
viewed as an externalities problem, but it is distinctive and significant
enough to merit separate analysis.
142. See, e.g., LOWENFELD, supra note 73, at 119-22.
143. See Note, Constructingthe State Extraterritorially,supra note 131.
144. Paul, Comity, supra note 4, at 63-66.
145.

See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COMPETITION AND COORDINATION (William

W. Bratton et al. eds., 1996).
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The analysis of regulatory competition focuses on the
challenges posed by the increasing mobility of economic actors in a
global economy for the maintenance of domestic regulatory
standards. The basic concern is that states will face pressure to lower
their regulatory standards in order to attract or retain investment and
employment within their borders. Examples include lowering of tax
rates, labor standards, and environmental standards. This problem has
been a common topic in discussions of regulation of economic
activity in federal states such as the United States. 146 More recently,
it has become a key subject in European integration and in the
NAFTA context. Regulatory competition concerns are increasingly
of concern for policy makers in an international system in which the
as
material barriers, such as geography, and the policy barriers, such
147
fading.
are
jurisdictions
distinct
separate
that
restrictions,
trade
There is a substantial academic debate as to whether
international regulatory competition is always a "race to the
bottom". 148 For many in the law and economics tradition, for
example, the existence of such competition among jurisdictions
provides a potentially useful restraint on inefficient forms of state
regulation, and rules that facilitate contractual choice of law should be
encouraged. 149 In general, contemporary discussions of regulatory
competition recognize that there may be a deregulatory tendency, but
that conclusions regarding the benefits or detriments of such trends

146. For an outstanding critical account of regulatory competition and related issues in
the context of U.S. economic federalism see Thomas Heller, Legal Theory and the Political
Economy of American Federalism, in INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW: EUROPE AND THE
AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE 254, 271-74 (Mauro Cappelletti, Monica Seccombe &
Joseph Weiler eds., 1986).
147. See, e.g., the articles in Regulatory Competition in Focus, 3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 215

(2000).
148. See David Chamy, Competition Among Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate
Law Rules: An American Perspective on the "Race to the Bottom" in the European
Communities, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 423 (1991); Lucian A. Bebehuk, Federalism and the
Corporation:The DesirableLimits on State Competition in CorporateLaw, 105 HARv. L.
REv. 1437 (1982). The earlier terms of the debate were set by William L. Cary, Federalism
and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 88 YALE. L.J. 663 (1978) (race to the
bottom concern) and Ralph K. Winter, State Law, ShareholderProtection,and the Theory of
the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977) (race to the top). The more cautious
contemporary position is evidenced in William W. Bratton, Corporate Law's Race to
Nowhere in Particular,44 U. TORONTO. L.J. 401 (1994)
149. See, e.g., Bruce Kobayashi & Larry Ribstein, Contractand JurisdictionalFreedom,
in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 325 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999). The most
common source for this argument about the benefits of jurisdictional competition for
efficiency is Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1954).
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require a more specific examination of the nature of the regulations,
the subject of regulation and the surrounding circumstances.150
Several aspects of internationalist reforms in private
international law raise substantial concerns about the negative impact
of regulatory competition in the area of transnational dispute
resolution. For example, regulatory competition concerns are raised
concerning the enhanced respect for dispute-resolution autonomy of
international business parties to choose choice of forum, choice of
law and arbitration clauses. Party choice in this respect proceeds
based on the preferences of the two parties and not based on larger
social concerns. The result is that the choices of substantive regimes
may avoid the greater social concerns embodied in national laws that
arguably have more to do with the transaction. Parties are better able
to avoid laws that are more socially protective but which increase the
costs to transacting parties.
The critique of the deregulatory impact of party autonomy has
been well-articulated in comments on the decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court affirming the ability of international commercial
arbitrations to arbitrate disputes which include claims under U.S.
antitrust or securities laws. In three key decisions, the United States
Supreme Court expanded the domain of arbitration over disputes,
including antitrust or securities claims, as a necessary concession to
the needs of contemporary international commerce. 151 The criticisms
were immediate, and indeed were largely reflected in the dissents in
Mitsubishi. "Quixotic internationalism" had so blinded the court,
wrote one critic, that legitimate American regulatory concerns were
sacrificed to internationalist objectives. 152 Respect for the foreign
court or international arbitral tribunal may provide "an opportunity
for a foreign or domestic party to opt out of U.S. regulation." 5 3 Paul
observes that "where capital is free to flee, national and local
jurisdictions seeking to protect domestic employment may be
compelled to bargain away regulations in order to keep jobs at
150. See William W. Bratton et al., Introduction to INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
COMPETITION AND CooR~rNATIoN 1 (WilliamW. Bratton et al. eds., 1996); Roberta Romano,
CorporateLaw as the Paradigmfor ContractualChoice of Law, in THE FALL AND RISE OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 370 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999).
151. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler-Chrysler Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470
U.S. 213 (1985). Similar criticisms were made of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (forum selection clause enforced in
consumer contract).
152. Carbonneau, Mitsubishi,supra note 34.
153. Paul, Comity, supra note 4, at 71.
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home."' 154 In this sense, deregulatory competition will harm workers
worldwide. Antitrust claims, it was argued, were beyond the capacity
of the arbitration process, and were in a realm which called for
expertise and outlooks which most business arbitrators lacked. 155
The ability reserved for courts to have a "second look" at the
recognition stage was imperfect at best, because any such review
would be circumscribed
to procedural matters and limited substantive
156
public policy review.
The concern about the suboptimal protection of national
regulatory interests is increased by recent studies of the construction
of the international commercial arbitration regime. These studies
evidence that some states' motivation for supporting arbitration may
have been to gain narrow pecuniary advantages associated with
involvement in arbitration, rather than to consider the broader
regulatory implications of the decision to promote arbitration.
W. Michael Reisman has questioned the motives behind reforms that
have limited the interference and control of national courts over
international arbitrations. 157 Reisman argues that a number of
jurisdictions loosened such controls not because of a genuine belief
that international commercial arbitration is the best system for dispute
resolution, but rather in an effort to attract the "business" of
international commercial arbitration to their state. 158 The analysis is
modeled on the process of regulatory competition in the U.S.
incorporation example, in which the state puts aside genuine
regulatory preferences in order to attract business for its lawyers,
accountants, and other attendant services. 159 Reisman identifies such
competition for arbitration business as motivating, for example,
reforms in Belgian and Swiss legislation. 160 The role of such
interests in influencing and frequently lobbying state authorities also
figures at least partly in the study by Dezalay and Garth of the world
161
of international commercial arbitrators.
154. Id. at73.
155. Carbonneau, Mitsubishi,supra note 34, at 126-27.
156. Id.; New York Convention, supra note 27, art. 5; UNCITRAL Model Law, supra
note 30, art. 36.
157. REISMAN, supra note 29.
158. Id. at 124.
159. These services are sometimes referred to as "producer services." See Harry W.
Arthurs, The Hollowing Out of Corporate Canada?, in GLOBALIZING INSTITUTIONS: CASE
STuIiES IN SOcIAL REGULATION AND INNOVATION 29 (Jane Jenson & Boaventura de Sousa
Santos eds., 2000).
160. REISMAN, supranote 29, at 141.
161. DEZALAY& GARTH, supra note 2.
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The challenges of regulatory competition for the regulatory
function of private international law are significant. Regulatory
competition may permit transnational business actors to play off
differences between state actors in order to reduce their regulatory
burden. If there is little ability to tie transnational actors to
jurisdictions where their conduct has effects, a state may be pressured
to reform private laws, such as tort laws, to ensure that it can keep or
attract business production.
B.

The Problem of "Liftoffi' in TransnationalPrivateActor
Values

In addition to, and in tandem with, regulatory gaps and
regulatory competition, effective transnational regulation is made still
more difficult by the enhanced autonomy of transnational networks of
private actors. Most obviously, the growth in the scale and scope of
such transnational networks increases the material power of private
162
actors who are the subjects of national regulation.
The inability of state systems to control the increasing
material power of transnational networks is made more problematic
by an increase in what Teubner, using Niklas Luhmann's term,
describes as their "autopoietic" character. 163 As social systems such
as these transnational networks achieve autonomy from state laws, the
norms and rules of these networks become reflexive and selfreinforcing. The dominant norms are found within the system itself.
The closed nature of the values of any system means, among other
things, that the system can interact only imperfectly and indirectly
with any other system after it becomes, for whatever reason, a
separate system.
Teubner suggests that transnational business
networks which use arbitration and lex mercatoria take on a lawmaking and law-generating character and engage participants to look
only to values from within that system as their binding laws.
The autopoietic character of transnational business systems
may undermine hopes that the regulatory function might be contained
within the new systems themselves. The adversarial structure of most
international disputes between private parties is such that at least one
162. For example, see the discussion of the "process of circular causation" by which "the
legal ground rules of economic struggle constitute the economic bargaining power of the
combatants," but then the legal rules "are themselves at least in part the product of the
conflicts they condition" in Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault, 15
LEGAL STuD.F. 327, 335-36 (1991).
163. Teubner, BreakingFrames, supra note 15.
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party will often find it worthwhile to advance and support the more
"regulatory" of positions. This is at least partly the response of the
majority decision in Mitsubishi to concerns about one-sided
presentation of legal positions in arbitrated disputes over antitrust
claims. 164 For each internationalist argument advanced by a party to
a private international dispute, another party will usually desire a
result in another direction. If it considers the issues carefully, any
particular business party should expect to be tactically and
opportunistically arguing for or against a more internationalist
application of a rule of private international law or of the underlying
substantive law. In both arbitrations and court cases, it would be the
rare case where both parties to a dispute would favor the same rule
and application; this is, after all, the foundation of the adversarial
system of dispute-resolution in common law systems.
In an autopoietic system, however, the sense of shared
interests and norms among parties may become so significant that it
colors perceptions of interests and leads parties not to appeal to
national legal systems even where it might be in their interests
otherwise defined. This loss of concern for the nation-state system
makes ignoring national laws and regulations all the more pervasive
because the national laws lose much of their legitimacy and
relevance. National laws may become less and less a part of the
routine experience of those involved in international transactions, and
these parties may fall out of the habit of thinking of these laws as
being of relevance, and, more perniciously, worthy of respect. This is
especially problematic when the arbitrators or adjudicators,
chosen by
165
thought.
of
system
same
the
into
fall
also
the parties,
Above all, it is a problem that the interests and values of nonparticipants are not part of the regulatory concerns of these new,
autopoietic systems.' 6 While these systems arguably could regulate
164. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. at 636-37 (even
in domestic courts, it is up to private litigants to pursue their statutory rights, and "so long as
prospective litigant is able to vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the
statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.").
165. The U.S. Supreme Court perhaps inadequately deals with this concern in Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. at 634, where it rejects "the
proposition that an arbitration panel will pose too great a danger of innate hostility to the
constraints on business conduct that antitrust law imposes." The Court reasons, citing an
amicus brief of the International Chamber of Commerce, that arbitrators are drawn from the
legal as well as business community, and parties will select arbitrators that are aware of the
legal components of the dispute.
166. For example, Caruso, supra note 74, at 23, notes that private parties "although
interested in the abolition of regulatory barriers, have no particular stake in the harmonisation
of private law.' This may be an example of where conflict exists among private actors, but
cooperation occurs where all gain at the expense of third parties.
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as well as facilitate international transactions, they tend to be less
inclusive in their policies and interests than territorially-defined
national regimes. Non-state systems may be less nationalistic and
fairer between the participants directly involved, but there is a cost to
those who are not included. Above all, the new systems suffer from
exclusion because they are not normative communities which include
the interests of all those affected by their activities. 167 While
territorially defined jurisdictions also exclude actors and interests,
such states tend to be more inclusive because of the relatively wellunderstood and inclusive idea of territorially-defined normative
communities.
C.

Regulation andAdjudication through the Countervailing
Networks of TransnationalCivil Society

In spite of the obvious regulatory problems, Teubner does not
take a pessimistic view of the emergence of systems that compete
with the nation-state. Rather Teubner seems to believe that systems
of advocates, interest groups, and values will emerge which will at
least partly compensate for the decline of state-based regulation and
law-making. 168 The examples he cites include labor law, the
multinational enterprise, professional self-regulation, human rights
discourses, and the ecological movement. 169 To many others, the
growth of multiple transnational identities offers the potential for
progressive governance and law.170 It remains to be seen, however,
what the effects of this pluralistic mix of systems, including state
systems, will be for policy concerns such as effective regulation.
An optimistic reading of the fragmentation of regulatory
authority may be that any regulatory gap will be temporary. First, it
may be that as international private actors become less regulated their
consciousness will change, and lead them to incorporate concerns for
wider interests into their decision-making.
The owners of
167. For a similar point concerning "insiders" and "outsiders," see Stone, supra note 50,
at 1024-36.
168. Teubner writes hopefully in BreakingFrames,supra note 15, at 157:
Lex mercatoria, the transnational law of economic transactions is not the only
case of global law without a state. It is not only the economy, but various
sectors of world society that are developing a global law of their own. And they
do so, as Giddens has put it, in "relative insulation" from the state, from official
international politics and international public law.
169. Id., See also GLOBAL LAW, supra note 2.
170. See, e.g., BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARDS A NEW COMMON SENSE
(1995).
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corporations might, either as individuals or through the corporation,
voluntarily make social contributions such as charitable contributions,
even if at present few seem to do so. More likely, "socially
conscious" business may make good business sense when potential
consumers, investors, and employees are attracted by progressive
corporate behavior. 171 The increase in voluntary corporate codes of
conduct falls into this category.
Second, and more important, transnational business actors
may be pressured to act more responsibly as interest groups and
government catch up with the changing regulatory scene. The pursuit
of interests in different venues-ranging from international lobbying
at the World Bank to local consumer boycotts-has been embraced
by many activists. 172 The new networks of human rights activism
have been identified by many scholars as good examples of
transnational and global regulatory networks. 173 The acceptance of
voluntary codes of conduct by some multinational corporations
concerned about reputational damage is sometimes viewed as an
example of the influence of countervailing networks on corporate
conduct.174

The desire to find alternatives to international-level
institutions modeled on state regulation is also attractive because
state-based regulation is under attack for failing to effectively protect
public interests.
Progressive critics of national administrative
structures have expressed concerns about bureaucratization and
regulatory capture. 1' 5 From a different political perspective, the
critiques by theorists of public choice have identified the degree to
which regulatory regimes are economically costly and subject to
interest group rent-seeking. 176 In the wake of theoretical and political
171. As in the brands developed by businesses such as Starbucks and The Body Shop,
see NAoMI KLEIN, No LOGO (1999), ch. 1.
172. Id.; see Kennedy, New World Order,supra note 64, at 348-49.
173. E.g., SASSEN, supra note 2, ch. 4; Andrea Bianchi, Globalization of Human Rights:
The Role of Non-state Actors, in GLOBAL LAW WIHoUT A STATE 179, 186-87 (Gunther
Teubner ed., 1997).
174. KLEIN, supra note 171, at430-35.
175. See, e.g., CHARLES LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS, 161-233 (1977). For an
earlier statement, see Robert Hale, Coercion and Distributionin a Supposedly Noncoercive
State, 38 POL. SC. Q. 470, 493 (1923):
The channels into which industry shall flow, then, as well as the apportionment
of the community's wealth, depend upon coercive arrangements. These
arrangements are put in force by various groups, some of whom derive their
coercive power from control over governmental machinery, some from their
own physical power to abstain from working.
176. See, e.g., COASE, THE FIRM, supra note 134, ch. 1; George J. Stigler, The Theory of
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971); W. Mark Cramin & Robert
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attack, many national regulatory regimes are being reduced or even
dismantled. Moreover, non-state social activism may be especially
effective because it is not limited by many of the constraints of statebased regulation. In particular, such social activism can employ a
variety of strategies-including legal challenges, economic boycotts,
and culture jamming--directly against non-state actors, such as large
businesses. 177
While regulation could be spread across a multitude of venues,
including private venues, there are a number of concerns about such a
dispersal of state-based regulation. First, there may be externalities to
non-parties that arise simply from the privatization of the process
itself.178 For example, private arbitrations are often confidential and,
as such, limit production of records and testimony, which are often
useful to regulators and activists. 179 Sophisticated contemporary
activists often use the very process of a trial itself, and reporting of
the trial, for the communication of various viewpoints with respect to
corporate conduct. 180 The controversies over the privatization of
legal processes is still more pronounced where arbitration processes
are used with respect to areas of clear public-private overlap, as in
private-party investor claims under the investment provisions of
Chapter Eleven of the North American Free Trade Agreement.' 8 ' In
McCormick, Regulatorsas Interest Groups, in THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE II 287 (James
Buchanan & Robert Tollison eds., 1984).
177. KLEIN, supra note 171.
178. David Chamy, illusions ofSpontaneous Order: "Norms" in ContractualRelations,
144 U. PENN. L. REv. 1841, 1852 (1996).
[R]eliance on such informal systems is particularly problematic because one
loses the "public goods" associated with more formal litigation: development of
a set of precedents; public revelation of information about such important policy
matters as accident rates; and... the use of judicial decision to propagate and
reinforce social norms. Note that all of these are goods that the parties
themselves-particularly powerful repeat transactors-would have no incentive
to consider or, indeed, may see as costs to themselves, although they are
benefits from the social point of view.
Id. (notes omitted).
179. For a similar view about access to corporate information provided under SEC
disclosure, see Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and
CorporateSocial Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999). Of course, many records
in litigation are confidential. However, the concern remains because while sometimes not
available, the record is frequently accessible.
180. See, e.g., JOHN VIDAL, McLIBEL: BURGER CULTURE ON TRIAL (1997); KLEIN, supra
note 171, at 387-93.
181. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 296 and 32
I.L.M. 605 (1993), ch. 11.
Under Chapter Eleven, foreign investors from NAFTA
jurisdictions can sue the governments of NAFTA states for compensation for harm to
investments caused by state measures; the arbitration processes under Part B of the Chapter
provide that claims are heard by arbitration tribunals set up under the Chapter, either under
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addition, to concerns about lack of transparency, the transfer of
adjudication into private realms may also weaken
the development of
182
law that occurs through the national courts.
Second, there may be a difference in outcomes between state
regulators or adjudicators and non-state arbitrators. State-based
private law often includes protection of third parties and social
interests among its substantive objectives, but there may be a
tendency for private adjudicators to ignore arguments about the
protection of individuals and groups not party to the actual decision in
their interpretation of these laws.' 83 This may result from a form of
"democracy deficit" in denationalized legal regimes. The nature of
the denationalized regulatory regimes is such that they are subject to
less pressure from different third-party constituencies than are
national regulators, yet their decisions do have an impact on third
parties. In the extreme case of Teubner's systems, the only
constituencies to which many of these systems are open are often
other private actors. While territorially-defined jurisdictions also
exclude interested parties, in comparison they are more inclusive
because of their broader scope of membership and their more widelyunderstood and relatively non-volitional concept of territorially
defined membership.
Third, there is a potential public goods or collective action
problem in regulation via countervailing networks. In particular,
systems that promote human rights, environmental, or labor standards
may not attract the commitment or resources of the individuals who
benefit from such activity. There is no equivalent of mandatory
national taxation, for example, to ensure that all that benefit from
regulation contribute to its funding. In contrast, private actors receive
direct economic benefits if they are able to externalize costs onto
parties who are either too weak on their own or too diffusely spread to
organize effective opposition.
the ICSID Convention or its Additional Facility Rules, or under articles 1116, 1117 and 1120
of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. Both ISCID and UNCITRAL arbitrations are
generally confidential. In response to heavy criticism of the lack of transparency of Chapter
Eleven processes, the trade ministers of the NAFTA parties have agreed to release rulings
once they are made. See Jeff Sallot & Heather Scoffield, Agreement means more open
NAFTA, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Aug. 1, 2001, at B1.
182. A similar concern is found in the more general debate over the public impact of
alternative dispute resolution. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J.
1073, 1085-86 (1984); Chamy, supra note 178.
183. An example of this is the tendency of arbitrators to reinstitute problematic publicprivate distinctions in their interpretation of disputes involving contracts and property rights.
See, e.g., Amr A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World: A Pleafor ReassessingBias
Under the Spectre ofNeoliberalism, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 419, 453-55 (2000).
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Fourth, in situations of international or other types of
delegated authority, there is a greater risk of fragmentation and
diffusion of responsibility. Among other concerns, one fear is that it
will be those actors with the resources, scale, and expertise to monitor
a complex regulatory terrain who will be the most able to advance
their interests. 184 The result will be a18patchwork of regulation that
varies substantially in its effectiveness. 5
In sum, there may be a substantial loss of regulatory power in
the transition from state regulation to the idea of countervailing
regulation by social and other networks. It therefore seems sensible
to consider more carefully the role that state-based and interstatebased regulation, including private laws and state courts, can play.
V.

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A VENUE FOR
TRANSNATIONAL REGULATORY CONCERNS

For transnational regulatory concerns, it seems important to
gauge more carefully how significant the "liftoff' of transnational
business is, and in particular, the role that state law and institutions
can still play. Counter to some extreme interpretations, the liftoff still
depends on the support of state institutions, including courts, as the
earlier discussion of cases like Mitsubishi has already made clear.
There are also other reasons, aside from simple enforcement of
arbitration clauses, that transnational business actors must have
recourse to state law and legal institutions. Because of these
necessary ties, the liftoff of transnational business networks can be
described not just as a matter of technical necessity, but also as a
result of decisions or
acquiescence by policy-makers such as
186
legislatures and courts.
184. This observation applies the hypothesis that "Repeat Players," such as large
corporate actors and their lawyers, develop expertise in the courts and are often able as a
consequence to limit progressive social change based in the courts. See Galanter, supra note
82.
185. E.g., KLEIN, supra note 171, at 435 (expressing such a concern about corporate
codes of conduct).
186. Cutler, supra note 64, at 394.
[E]lites draw on liberal mythology concerning the superiority of private
regulation to establish national and international private regulatory structures,
which effectively delegate enforcement powers to the private sphere. The
development of an international institutional context for arbitration, centered
around the work of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
and the many private international institutions, is critical to the strength of the
arbitration norm. Liberal mythology has the sanction of states and is reproduced
by cooperative governments and corporate elites in their rhetoric and in the law.
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The Liftoff and Touchdown of TransnationalBusiness
Dispute-Resolution and the DialecticalRelationshipof State
andNon-State Systems
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Domestic private laws and domestic courts have some
potential to promote regulatory objectives because the contention that
transnational business relations have achieved "liftoff' from nationstate legal systems can be contested as an empirical matter both (a) as
a description of the understanding of the legal systems and (b) as a
description of the ability of private networks, such as those of
international commercial arbitration and lex mercatoria, to free
themselves from national legal regimes.
Although transnational business and financial actors have
become much more mobile (and clearly more mobile than labor),
187
most businesses must still, to some degree, "put down roots."
National courts are still one of the locations at which international
transactions and the international economy must "touch down" to
achieve certain benefits. 188 For example, national private law
regimes are important for parties to international transactions because
of the need for effective enforcement of contractual agreements and
protection of property rights, as those interested in protecting
189
intellectual property or electronic commerce have discovered.

Merchant autonomy in the medieval period operated largely due to the absence
of the state. Today, merchant autonomy exists with the endorsement and
support of state elites. Furthermore, states participate in the construction of the
myths by according private actors wide scope in both structuring and enforcing
their international commercial agreements.
Id. (notes omitted).
187. DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF MODERNITY 234 (1990).
188. Saskia Sassen demonstrates well how, for example, contemporary international
finance is still territorially grounded, although now concentrated in several key "global
cities," such as New York, Tokyo and London. SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBAL CITIEs (1988).
189. See NORTH, supra note 8; Douglass C. North, Institutions, Transaction Costs and
Economic Growth, 25 ECON. INQUIRY 419 (1987). Legal scholars have debated similar

developments, although with greater sensitivity to the complex nature of "property" and
"contract." For example, Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY
(NOMOS XXlI) 69, 75-76 (J.Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980), discusses the
importance to increased capitalist exploitation of division of labor and function and the
economies of scale. Grey notes that:
The transformation of a preindustrial economy of private proprietors into an
industrial economy by the process suggested here presupposes that the
entrepreneurs, financiers, and lawyers who carry the process through have the
imagination to liberate themselves from the imprisoning concept of property as
the simple ownership of a thing by an individual person. They must be able to
design new forms of finance and control for enterprise, which can take
maximum advantage of the efficiencies of scale and division of function, forms
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Without at least some form of national private law of property and
contractual enforcement, many international transactions would not
occur. 190 As those interested in protecting intellectual property or
electronic commerce have found, it is difficult for private actors to
operate profitably without an effective legal system which will
facilitate transactions by protecting property and contractual
enforcement. A commonly-cited example is the lack of legal
protection of property rights in the "piracy" in China and elsewhere of
computer and other software without compensation to the original
creators. 191 Internet commerce, or e-commerce, is also thought to be
hampered by the difficulty of ensuring the protection of property
rights. While some technological methods, such as encryption
technology, are available, most commentators realize that there is no
substitute for the security provided by state-based regulation and
laws. 192 Predictably, the same parties which advocate an active
governmental role in defending strong property rights and contractual
enforcement in new areas of intellectual property and e-commerce
across borders are often equally concerned to argue that governments
not "interfere" with the development and freedom of these realms
through laws that regulate with respect to matters such as taxation,
content (including pornographic and racist material), viewership, or
the like.
These "touchdown" points are potential locations to regulate
conduct of transnational actors. It is particularly important to use
"touchdown" points as locations to protect the interests of third
parties who are affected by the goods, production, or other conduct of
transnational actors. National private law regimes such as regimes of
tort law in common law jurisdictions and delict in civil law
jurisdictions provide a significant tool for parties who are not
necessarily parties to contract to seek effective control and redress for
the harmful impact of international activity.

that fractionate traditional ownership and that create claims remote from
tangible objects.
Id.
Grey further notes that there is a tradeoff, even in terms of aggregate economic production, as
to the best balance between specialization through disaggregation of property rights and the
need for facilitating market transactions through reducing the complexity of property rights.
190. NoRTH, supra note 8, at 57-58. For a critique of this view of the value of strict
enforcement of property and contract laws and credible commitment, see Kennedy &
Michelman, supra note 61, at 726-29, 745-47.
191. For a more sophisticated view of the nature of copyright violation in China, see
WILLIAM P. ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENCE (1995).

192. Debora Spar & Jeffery Bussgang, Ruling the Net, 74 HARv. Bus. REv. 125 (1996).
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More specifically with respect to arbitration, international
commercial arbitration still relies very much on the support of
national legal systems.
The ultimate authority for arbitration
procedures is that they are recognized and supported by national
legislative and judicial processes. Without the power of state legal
systems behind them, a party who expects to do poorly in the
arbitration will have no incentive to comply and may seek recourse to
national legal systems. 193 Consequently, international commercial
arbitration operates very much "in the shadow of the law," and
national laws continue to impose important limits. 194 For example,
lex mercatoria is a controversial basis for an applicable law,
especially in common law jurisdictions. 195 There are also limits on
the willingness to compel arbitration, for example, in situations of
coercion or illegality.
The relationship between transnational private disputeresolution and national laws is better understood at the present time as
a dialectical one, where the rules of private international law are an
important part of the dialectical relationship in which neither has a
clearly dominant status. The international business communities and
networks may therefore be best viewed as "semi-autonomous social
fields" as has been argued in accounts of legal pluralism. 196 Clearly,
Teubner and others are correct in observing that state laws no longer
have, and probably never had, a normative monopoly on transnational
conduct and that non-state based norm systems may have become the
more significant force in the global economy. However, it seems
equally clear that there is some ability for national authorities not just
to abandon state laws in the face of these other normative systems,

193. Cutler, supra note 64; Vagts, Dispute Resolution, supra note 1, at 64-65.
194. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case ofDivorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).

195. See, e.g., Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp. v. Kuwait Insurance Co., [1984] 1 A.C. 50,
65 (H.L.) (Eng.) (per Lord Diplock); DICEY & MoRms, supra note 3, at 1218-19; CANADIAN
LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 182.
196. See, e.g., Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social
Field as an Appropriate Subject ofStudy, 7 L. & Soc'Y REv. 719 (1973); ARTHURS, supra
note 6, at 177-87; Sally E. Merry, Legal Pluralism,22 L. & Soc'Y REV. 869 (1988); John
Griffiths, Legal Pluralism and the Theory of Legislation-With Special Reference to the
Regulation ofEuthanasia,in LEGAL POLYCENTRICITY: CONSEQUENCES OF PLURALISM IN LAW

201 (Hanne Petersen & Henrik Zahle eds., 1995). Griffiths summarizes how legal pluralism
challenges the "command-conception" of legal rules by (a) emphasizing the social character
of man rather than assuming atomistic individualism and (b) recognizing the sociallymediated and contingent character of legal communication rather than assuming perfect
communication, and (c) viewing social reality as one of legal realism rather than a normative
monopoly by state laws.
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but rather to use the remaining leverage of private law as a site for
international regulation.
The present situation with respect to international business
networks somewhat resembles the situation with respect to the use of
contract by private parties to provide private orderings within a
national law context. Such private ordering in the domestic context is
not thought to automatically break the frame of state law, either in the
197
self-understanding of the law or as a matter of effective control.
The concept of semi-autonomous social fields highlights that the
balance in effective influence and power of different norm-generating
sources can vary. The balance partly changes over time depending on
the accumulation of decisions made in each social field. This point
was long ago expressed in the domestic context by observers of
private ordering. 198 Extending this analysis to the international realm
provides good reasons for national courts and legislators to consider
more carefully the role that private law can play in containing the
regulatory and democratic challenges that would result if the
internationalist reforms that encourage party autonomy did reach the
point of full private actor "liftoff."
B.

PrivateInternationalLaw and the Constitution of a Pluralist
System of TransnationalRegulation

Internationalist reform in private international law has largely
bracketed the role of private international law in addressing
cosmopolitan regulatory concerns. The objectives of facilitating
international commerce, increasing international cooperation, and
ensuring cosmopolitan fairness have not been read broadly enough to
include a consideration of the role of private international law in
transnational regulation. Most internationalist reform fails to consider
directly the objective of expanding the domain for national law and
transnational non-corporate actors to act as countervailing regulatory
forces.
This need not be so. Decisions of courts and legislators can
enable regulation of transnational business networks by instituting
different kinds of legal liability and facilitating other forms of direct
action by non-state actors. Neither must this model of governance be
based exclusively on state-based processes of dispute resolution. But
197. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective,40
YALE L.J. 704, 727-32 (1931).
198. Louis Jaffe, Law Making by PrivateGroups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201 (1937).
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there needs to be an express sense of the role of state institutions in
influencing the contours of the plural ways-including by state
institutions as well as non-state actors-in which "governing"
transnational business behavior can occur.
A major concern about regulation through state private laws is
the fear of parochialism. While there is a possibility of "overregulation" that may act as a disincentive for beneficial international
economic activities, the lack of coordinated regulatory authority and
the lack of representation in national legislatures of all the parties
impacted by legislation or the absence of legislation is more likely to
lead to "systematic under-regulation of international business." 199 In
this situation, the best solution to these dangers is an international
agreement that sets out the mutually-acceptable rules for assumption
of jurisdiction, as the Brussels and Lugano Conventions do for
Europe. However, in the absence of international agreement and
given the continuing fragmented nature of regulatory authority in the
international system, the continuing use of national laws applied
extraterritorially seems like a necessary practice.
Dodge, for
example, argues that in the absence of international agreement, the
second-best policy from a regulatory perspective is judicial
unilateralism, a policy of aggressive assumption of extraterritorial or
long-arm jurisdiction by national courts over business conduct. He
argues that not only will this protect against under-regulation, but200
is
"more likely to lead to international agreement in the long run."
Instead, the challenge becomes to describe what the appropriate
understanding and boundaries of the practice should be. Most of all,
this requires attention to the specific transnational regulatory
challenge claimed to be at stake, the degree of international
cooperation possible, and a sense of how to control for parochial
motives for the unilateralism in the particular rule under discussion.

199. Dodge, supranote 139, at 153.
200. Id at 158. For discussion of the game theory analysis behind this belief, see id.at
158-68. Dodge argues that unilateralism is appropriate for courts because they are unable to
directly negotiate cooperative agreements. Unilateralism, he argues, "may create friction in
the short run, [but] it is more likely to lead to international cooperation in the end." Id. at
164. He argues that conflict has often spurred political negotiations and furthermore that the
over-regulation that results from extraterritoriality in antitrust disfavors multinational
enterprises, actors who are "generally in a better position than consumers to push for changes
in the status quo." Id. at 167.
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Differentiating Among Components of the Internationalist
Reform Agenda

As an initial guiding principle, promoting transnational
regulation through national private laws requires that legal decisionmakers more carefully distinguish between different parts of the
doctrinal package of internationalist reforms. The liberalization of
rules on recognition and enforcement would seem to assist in
transnational regulation, by easing the ability of plaintiffs to enforce
liability judgments gained in national courts. An example of an
internationalist reform that would further assist transnational
regulation would be to ease the rule in common law jurisdictions that
courts will not enforce the penal, revenue, or other public laws of
foreign jurisdictions. 20 1
Internationalist reform in private
international law has not generally changed the traditional refusal to
enforce such laws. 202 The refusal to enforce such laws abroad means
that substantial limits exist on the use of national regulatory regimes
to compensate for regulatory gaps. For example, some national
regulatory regimes, such as environmental law regimes, often include
court judgments for damages awarded against defendants. Reform of
private international law in the direction of more generous
enforcement of some
public laws of other jurisdictions would help to
20 3
ease this tension.
In contrast, the regulatory function is potentially challenged
by internationalist reforms by state courts to restrain their jurisdiction
in the interests of comity. 20 4
Greater reluctance to assume
jurisdiction and increased grants of stays of actions on the basis of
forum non conveniens make it more difficult for plaintiffs seeking to
regulate the international conduct of defendants through private law
actions. With the objective of reducing short-term conflict among
201. DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 3, at 97-108, rule 3.
202. See, e.g., Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, 103 F. Supp. 2d 134
(N.D.N.Y. 2000) (claim by Canadian government for taxes related to alleged smuggling of
tobacco dismissed for reasons including common law revenue rule which normally prevents
US courts from enforcing foreign government tax law).
203. See, for example, United States v. Ivey, (1995) 139 D.L.R. 674, 689 (Ont. Gen.
Div.), aff'd (1996) 139 D.L.R. 570 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.), where an Ontario court gave summary
judgment to enforce civil judgments obtained pursuant to U.S. environmental clean-up
legislation, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
1980, 42 U.S.C., § 9607(a). In its discussion of the rule concerning penal, revenue, or other
public laws, the lower court carefully examined the U.S. judgment, characterizing it as
primarily a cost recovery measure, and the degree to which the "public law" prohibition
applied to hybrid regulatory regimes that included civil liability. See id. at 684-89.
204. See Paul, Comity, supra note 4.
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jurisdictions and showing proper respect for foreign courts and laws,
internationalist-minded courts are potentially sacrificing cosmopolitan
regulatory interests that are inadequately protected by international
regulatory agreements.
The controversial use of forum non
conveniens analysis to decline jurisdiction over foreign tort claims, as
in the Bhopal chemical
disaster, demonstrates some of the
205
deregulatory dangers.
Perhaps most clearly, the regulatory function is jeopardized by
internationalist reforms that increase party autonomy and choice over
dispute resolution. There are significant risks to parties when there is
inadequate judicial oversight for problems such as limited information
and unequal bargaining power in many contexts where arbitration,
forum-selection and choice of law clauses are "agreed" to.
Restrictions on choice of forum clauses with respect to consumer and
individual employment contracts are examples of such oversight.2 °6
Most significantly, the ability of private parties to resolve disputes
"among themselves" ignores the broader context of the current
international system where there are inadequate transnational public
laws or institutions to protect third-party interests. Regulatory gaps,
regulatory competition, autopoietic norms, and weaknesses of
countervailing regulatory networks mean that the continued
regulatory function of state private laws may remain one of the few
"levers" of influence for third parties.
2.

Constituting a Pluralist System of Regulatory Governance

In addition to attending to the role of domestic laws in
governing transnational conduct, it is also important for private
international law policy-makers to understand the way in which
transnational networks, interests, and identities are part of the
205. In Re Union Carbide Corporation Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December,
1984, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987). The Second Circuit ruled that a suit against Union
Carbide by Indian victims and the Indian government of the Bhopal chemical disaster was
forum non conveniens in the New York courts, and should be heard in the courts of India.
This conclusion was reached in spite of the submissions of the Indian government who
agreed that the suit was better heard in the American court. The Court did affirm certain
conditions for the dismissal, including that Union Carbide consent to the Indian Court's
jurisdiction and waive the statute of limitations as a defense. Union Carbide was also
required to consent to submit to the broad discovery under the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
For critical commentary, see INCONVENIENT FORUM AND CONVENmNT
CATASTROPHE: THE BHOPAL CASE (Upendra Baxi ed., 1986) and Paul, Comity, supra note 4,
at 61-62.
206. This is partly recognized in the Preliminary Draft Convention, supra note 25. See
text accompanying notes 88-92, supra.
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contemporary global system. 20 7 Private law is probably not the best
tool for effective regulation in domestic contexts. But private
international law and domestic private laws clearly have a role to play
in the development of an effective pluralistic conception of regulatory
governance that mixes international governmental treaties and
institutions, state public laws, transnational
non-governmental
20 8
organizations (NGOs), and local private actors.
An awareness of the growth of plural and complex identities
and interests across borders, for example, would suggest that national
courts begin to define jurisdictional interests more broadly to include
a consideration of the interests of actors other than members of the
jurisdiction. 20 9 Complex forms of group interests as well as shared
transnational interests are traditionally weakly protected by state
courts in many common law jurisdictions. 2 10 This seems problematic
in a transnational system where there are significant cross-border
flows of people, goods, and ideas and where national
identities are
2 11
mixed with hybrid and dynamic social identities.
In addition, domestic private law systems have a role in
facilitating the efforts of countervailing transnational and sub-national
networks of human rights activists, labor groups, and environmental
NGOs to act in a regulatory oversight role. These groups frequently
use national courts and private law claims as part of their strategies.
National courts should not allow their concern about facilitating
international transactions to overwhelm the value of providing fora
for members of transnational civil society to play their oversight role.
For example, courts might self-consciously distinguish public interest
litigation for special consideration in determining their jurisdiction
related to activities that cross national borders, in cases such as tort
claims for environmental damage caused by multinational enterprises
2 12
that are brought in the courts of the home country of the enterprise.
207. TOWARD A GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY (Michael Walzer ed., 1995).
208. See, e.g., TORTURE AS TORT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF
TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION (Craig Scott ed., 2001) [hereinafter TORTURE AS
TORT]; Joerges, supra note 49.
209. See Wai, supra note 58, at 238-39.
210. See Note, Constructingthe State Extraterritorially,supra note 131, at 1304-05.
211.

BEITZ, supra note 42; COSMOPOLITIcS: THINKING AND FEELING BEYOND THE NATION

(Peng Cheah & Bruce Robbins eds., 1998).
212. Recherches Intemationales Quebec v. Cambior Inc., [1998] QJ No.2334 (Quebec
Superior Court, 14 August 1998). On this case and more generally on the use of private law
remedies to deal with transnational business actors in the mining sector, see Sam L. Seck,
EnvironmentalHarm in Developing Countries Caused by Subsidiaries of Canadian Mining
Corporations:The Interface of Public and PrivateInternationalLaw, 37 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L.
139 (1999).
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The lack of effective remedies for human rights claims in foreign
jurisdictions should be considered by local courts in deciding whether
to hear claims against foreign state or non-state actors for human
rights abuses, such as torture. 213 Similarly, courts should be vigilant
in resisting efforts of business or foreign state actors to use
defamation suits to limit the communications of non-state activists
who attempt to shed critical light on, for example, human rights
2
abuses or environmental degradation by corporate or state actors. 4
VI.

CONCLUSION

Transnational business networks pose regulatory challenges
for legal regimes grounded in sovereign states. This Article argues
that one way to understand this challenge is to critically examine the
private law reforms that have increased the autonomy of transnational
business actors without an equivalent increase in transnational
regulation. It is argued that well-intentioned policy argumentation for
internationalist legal reform in private law based on liberal
international goals-such as facilitation of international trade,
enhancement of interstate cooperation, and promotion of
cosmopolitan fairness-has obscured the role that private law and
private international law play in regulating transnational conduct.
The challenges of regulation in a changing globalized system
require a revival of the role of private international law in creatively
attending to the regulation of transnational business conduct, not an
abandonment of this regulatory function in the face of concerns about
inefficiency and parochialism.
A concern about transnational
regulatory purposes does not require that all internationalist reform be
abandoned. Internationalist policy arguments concerning the benefits
of international trade, inter-state cooperation, and cosmopolitan nondiscrimination are valuable counters against unilateralism and
disregard for international law and institutions.
However,
internationalism needs to be defined more broadly to better protect
other cosmopolitan policy objectives and ultimately to have greater
legitimacy.
Private international law and domestic private laws can play a
role in the development of an effective pluralistic conception of
213. See generallyTORTURE AS TORT, supra note 208.
214. See, e.g., Lee v. Globe and Mail, 52 O.R. 3d 652. (S.C.J. 2001) (Can.). For the
best-known recent example, the McLibel trial, see VIDAL, supra note 180 and KLEIN, supra
note 171, 387-93.
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regulatory governance that mixes international governmental treaties
and institutions, states, transnational NGOs, and local private
actors. 2 15 To achieve that role, however, a more sophisticated
internationalism in private international law requires that non-state
actors, courts, and legislators expressly recognize the regulatory
function that private international law has played, and should continue
to play, in decisions regarding particular doctrinal reforms. In the
broader context of changes in the global system that challenge
traditional state roles, it becomes even more crucial that the
regulatory aspect of private laws-something that all legal scholars
understand-is emphasized and creatively utilized.

215.

See, e.g., TORTURE AS TORT, supra note 208.

